{"title":"无需解释","authors":"Michael Huemer","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00187-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>Appearance</i> <i>and Explanation</i>, McCain and Moretti raise three objections to Phenomenal Conservatism: the problem of explaining defeaters, the problem of reflective awareness, and the bootstrapping problem. I address all three problems and then raise three objections to Phenomenal Explanationism: the problem of necessary truths, the problem of unreflective observers, and the problem of excessive flexibility. I conclude that there is no need to supplement Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"No need for explanation\",\"authors\":\"Michael Huemer\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s44204-024-00187-2\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>In <i>Appearance</i> <i>and Explanation</i>, McCain and Moretti raise three objections to Phenomenal Conservatism: the problem of explaining defeaters, the problem of reflective awareness, and the bootstrapping problem. I address all three problems and then raise three objections to Phenomenal Explanationism: the problem of necessary truths, the problem of unreflective observers, and the problem of excessive flexibility. I conclude that there is no need to supplement Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":93890,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Asian journal of philosophy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Asian journal of philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-024-00187-2\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asian journal of philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-024-00187-2","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In Appearanceand Explanation, McCain and Moretti raise three objections to Phenomenal Conservatism: the problem of explaining defeaters, the problem of reflective awareness, and the bootstrapping problem. I address all three problems and then raise three objections to Phenomenal Explanationism: the problem of necessary truths, the problem of unreflective observers, and the problem of excessive flexibility. I conclude that there is no need to supplement Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism.