{"title":"非正规性对非洲汽油消费效率的监管影响:拟议的两部分互补假设检验","authors":"Philip Kofi Adom","doi":"10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107970","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study provides new evidence for the regulatory impact of informality on gasoline efficiency in Africa. I propose a Two-Part Complementary Hypothesis (hereafter referred to as the TPCH test), advocating a differential approach to promoting gasoline efficiency: (1) an inverted U-shaped relationship between informality and gasoline inefficiency, and (2) a U-shaped relationship between government regulation and informality, with a significant level effect. The findings indicate an inverted U-shaped effect of informality on gasoline efficiency and a level-negative effect of regulation on informality. These results suggest a differential strategy for enhancing gasoline efficiency. Government regulation is more effective in economies at the pre-saturation stage (characterized by normal growth levels of informality) but proves ineffective in economies at the post-saturation stage (characterized by abnormal growth levels of informality), where energy-saving behaviors may be self-motivated. This is corroborated by the inefficiency equation, where indicators of good governance, such as the rule of law, control of corruption, and regulatory quality, are statistically significant in advancing energy efficiency goals. Gasoline efficiency performance varies across countries, with the higher performers also being the continent's most economically advanced. However, these estimates risk downward bias if outliers or unobserved/observed heterogeneity are not considered.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11665,"journal":{"name":"Energy Economics","volume":"140 ","pages":"Article 107970"},"PeriodicalIF":13.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Regulatory impact of informality on gasoline consumption efficiency in Africa: A proposed two-part complementary hypothesis test\",\"authors\":\"Philip Kofi Adom\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107970\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>This study provides new evidence for the regulatory impact of informality on gasoline efficiency in Africa. I propose a Two-Part Complementary Hypothesis (hereafter referred to as the TPCH test), advocating a differential approach to promoting gasoline efficiency: (1) an inverted U-shaped relationship between informality and gasoline inefficiency, and (2) a U-shaped relationship between government regulation and informality, with a significant level effect. The findings indicate an inverted U-shaped effect of informality on gasoline efficiency and a level-negative effect of regulation on informality. These results suggest a differential strategy for enhancing gasoline efficiency. Government regulation is more effective in economies at the pre-saturation stage (characterized by normal growth levels of informality) but proves ineffective in economies at the post-saturation stage (characterized by abnormal growth levels of informality), where energy-saving behaviors may be self-motivated. This is corroborated by the inefficiency equation, where indicators of good governance, such as the rule of law, control of corruption, and regulatory quality, are statistically significant in advancing energy efficiency goals. Gasoline efficiency performance varies across countries, with the higher performers also being the continent's most economically advanced. However, these estimates risk downward bias if outliers or unobserved/observed heterogeneity are not considered.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":11665,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Energy Economics\",\"volume\":\"140 \",\"pages\":\"Article 107970\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":13.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-10-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Energy Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988324006789\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Energy Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988324006789","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本研究为非洲非正规性对汽油效率的监管影响提供了新的证据。我提出了一个两部分互补假说(以下简称 TPCH 检验),主张采用差异化方法来提高汽油效率:(1)非正规性与汽油低效之间存在倒 U 型关系;(2)政府监管与非正规性之间存在 U 型关系,且存在显著的水平效应。研究结果表明,非正规性对汽油效率的影响呈倒 U 型,而监管对非正规性的影响呈水平负效应。这些结果表明了提高汽油效率的不同策略。政府监管对处于前饱和阶段(以非正规性正常增长水平为特征)的经济体更为有效,但对处于后饱和阶段(以非正规性异常增长水平为特征)的经济体则证明无效,在后饱和阶段,节能行为可能是自我激励的。低效方程也证实了这一点,在低效方程中,法治、腐败控制和监管质量等善治指标对推进能效目标具有显著的统计意义。各国的汽油效率表现各不相同,表现较好的国家也是非洲大陆经济最发达的国家。然而,如果不考虑异常值或未观察到/观察到的异质性,这些估计值有向下偏差的风险。
Regulatory impact of informality on gasoline consumption efficiency in Africa: A proposed two-part complementary hypothesis test
This study provides new evidence for the regulatory impact of informality on gasoline efficiency in Africa. I propose a Two-Part Complementary Hypothesis (hereafter referred to as the TPCH test), advocating a differential approach to promoting gasoline efficiency: (1) an inverted U-shaped relationship between informality and gasoline inefficiency, and (2) a U-shaped relationship between government regulation and informality, with a significant level effect. The findings indicate an inverted U-shaped effect of informality on gasoline efficiency and a level-negative effect of regulation on informality. These results suggest a differential strategy for enhancing gasoline efficiency. Government regulation is more effective in economies at the pre-saturation stage (characterized by normal growth levels of informality) but proves ineffective in economies at the post-saturation stage (characterized by abnormal growth levels of informality), where energy-saving behaviors may be self-motivated. This is corroborated by the inefficiency equation, where indicators of good governance, such as the rule of law, control of corruption, and regulatory quality, are statistically significant in advancing energy efficiency goals. Gasoline efficiency performance varies across countries, with the higher performers also being the continent's most economically advanced. However, these estimates risk downward bias if outliers or unobserved/observed heterogeneity are not considered.
期刊介绍:
Energy Economics is a field journal that focuses on energy economics and energy finance. It covers various themes including the exploitation, conversion, and use of energy, markets for energy commodities and derivatives, regulation and taxation, forecasting, environment and climate, international trade, development, and monetary policy. The journal welcomes contributions that utilize diverse methods such as experiments, surveys, econometrics, decomposition, simulation models, equilibrium models, optimization models, and analytical models. It publishes a combination of papers employing different methods to explore a wide range of topics. The journal's replication policy encourages the submission of replication studies, wherein researchers reproduce and extend the key results of original studies while explaining any differences. Energy Economics is indexed and abstracted in several databases including Environmental Abstracts, Fuel and Energy Abstracts, Social Sciences Citation Index, GEOBASE, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Journal of Economic Literature, INSPEC, and more.