对公司信息披露和收益管理的关注:从美国证券交易委员会文件下载中获得的证据

IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107264
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引用次数: 0

摘要

利用利益相关者对美国证券交易委员会文件的下载量来代表他们对企业信息披露的关注程度,我们发现,企业文件的下载量越高,企业基于权责发生制的向上收益管理就越少。这一结果表明,利益相关者的关注限制了公司报告的偏差。我们还发现,当有更多的利益相关者也下载公司同行或客户的文件或公司上一年的文件时,以及当公司管理者有更大的动机进行收益管理时,美国证券交易委员会文件的下载量与收益管理之间的负相关关系会更加明显。在补充分析中,我们发现了盈利管理方法替代的一些证据。具体来说,下载公司申报文件的次数越多,通过超额生产(一种实际收益管理形式)和收入分类转移进行的收益管理就越高。
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Attention to corporate disclosure and earnings Management: Evidence from downloads of SEC filings
Using stakeholders’ downloads of SEC filings as a proxy for their attention to corporate disclosure, we find that a higher number of downloads of a firm’s filings is associated with less accruals-based upward earnings management at the firm. This result suggests that this attention from stakeholders constrains corporate reporting bias. We also find that the negative association between downloads of SEC filings and earnings management is more pronounced when there are more stakeholders also download filings of the firm’s peers or customers or its previous year’s filings and when the firm’s managers have greater incentives to manage earnings. In supplementary analyses, we find some evidence of substitution in earnings management methods. Specifically, a higher number of downloads of a firm’s filings is associated with upward earnings management via overproduction (a form of real earnings management) and income classification shifting.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
2.80%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.
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