{"title":"群众的力量：网络平台互动对绿色清洗的影响","authors":"Hui Zheng, Jing Zhang","doi":"10.1002/csr.2933","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Greenwashing is a fraudulent environmental, social and governance (ESG) behavior. Previous literature has explored the impact of unidirectional disclosure on greenwashing. However, how interactive disclosures affect greenwashing has not been fully explored. Given the background of the regulatory transformation of China's capital market, we use data from the Q&A boards of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) “Interactive Easy” and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) “SSE e-Interactive” online platforms to investigate the impact of interactive disclosure between firms and retail investors on greenwashing. We find that online platform interactions (OPIs) inhibit greenwashing. Moreover, such negative effects are more pronounced for firms with high-quality internal controls, high executive shareholding, high analyst coverage, low financing constraints, and executives with overseas backgrounds. Overall, our research provides empirical evidence that OPIs improve capital market efficiency by inhibiting greenwashing.</p>","PeriodicalId":48334,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management","volume":"31 6","pages":"6481-6503"},"PeriodicalIF":8.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The power of crowds: The effect of online platform interactions on greenwashing\",\"authors\":\"Hui Zheng, Jing Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/csr.2933\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Greenwashing is a fraudulent environmental, social and governance (ESG) behavior. Previous literature has explored the impact of unidirectional disclosure on greenwashing. However, how interactive disclosures affect greenwashing has not been fully explored. Given the background of the regulatory transformation of China's capital market, we use data from the Q&A boards of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) “Interactive Easy” and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) “SSE e-Interactive” online platforms to investigate the impact of interactive disclosure between firms and retail investors on greenwashing. We find that online platform interactions (OPIs) inhibit greenwashing. Moreover, such negative effects are more pronounced for firms with high-quality internal controls, high executive shareholding, high analyst coverage, low financing constraints, and executives with overseas backgrounds. Overall, our research provides empirical evidence that OPIs improve capital market efficiency by inhibiting greenwashing.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48334,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management\",\"volume\":\"31 6\",\"pages\":\"6481-6503\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":8.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/csr.2933\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/csr.2933","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The power of crowds: The effect of online platform interactions on greenwashing
Greenwashing is a fraudulent environmental, social and governance (ESG) behavior. Previous literature has explored the impact of unidirectional disclosure on greenwashing. However, how interactive disclosures affect greenwashing has not been fully explored. Given the background of the regulatory transformation of China's capital market, we use data from the Q&A boards of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) “Interactive Easy” and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) “SSE e-Interactive” online platforms to investigate the impact of interactive disclosure between firms and retail investors on greenwashing. We find that online platform interactions (OPIs) inhibit greenwashing. Moreover, such negative effects are more pronounced for firms with high-quality internal controls, high executive shareholding, high analyst coverage, low financing constraints, and executives with overseas backgrounds. Overall, our research provides empirical evidence that OPIs improve capital market efficiency by inhibiting greenwashing.
期刊介绍：
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management is a journal that publishes both theoretical and practical contributions related to the social and environmental responsibilities of businesses in the context of sustainable development. It covers a wide range of topics, including tools and practices associated with these responsibilities, case studies, and cross-country surveys of best practices. The journal aims to help organizations improve their performance and accountability in these areas.
The main focus of the journal is on research and practical advice for the development and assessment of social responsibility and environmental tools. It also features practical case studies and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to sustainability. The journal encourages the discussion and debate of sustainability issues and closely monitors the demands of various stakeholder groups. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management is a refereed journal, meaning that all contributions undergo a rigorous review process. It seeks high-quality contributions that appeal to a diverse audience from various disciplines.
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