DEFending 集成电路布局

IF 6.3 1区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security Pub Date : 2024-11-06 DOI:10.1109/TIFS.2024.3492810
Jitendra Bhandari;Jayanth Gopinath;Mohammed Ashraf;Johann Knechtel;Ozgur Sinanoglu;Ramesh Karri
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引用次数: 0

摘要

现代集成电路(ic)需要一个复杂的外包供应链,包括计算机辅助设计(CAD)工具、专家知识和先进的铸造厂。这种复杂性导致了各种安全威胁,比如对手在外包过程中插入的木马,还有运行时威胁,比如物理探测。我们提出的设计时解决方案“防御”是一个可扩展的CAD框架,用于全面评估和主动缓解多种突出威胁。其目标是在ic的物理设计期间优先考虑安全问题,而不是传统的功率、性能和面积(PPA)目标。国防部利用迭代和模块化方法来评估和减轻IC布局中的各种已知漏洞,这些漏洞针对敏感的有源设备和电线。它是一个灵活和可扩展的脚本框架,不需要修改商业CAD流,但具有相同的高水平的设计质量。我们对具有代表性的现代IC设计进行了广泛的案例研究,以“防御”特洛伊木马插入,探测和串扰攻击的布局。我们正在为社区提供框架。
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DEFending Integrated Circuit Layouts
Modern integrated circuits (ICs) require a complex, outsourced supply-chain, involving computer-aided design (CAD) tools, expert knowledge, and advanced foundries. This complexity has led to various security threats, such as Trojans inserted by adversaries during outsourcing, but also run-time threats like physical probing. Our proposed design-time solution, DEFense , is an extensible CAD framework for holistic assessment and proactive mitigation of multiple prominent threats. The goal is to prioritize security concerns during the physical design of ICs, alongside traditional power, performance, and area (PPA) objectives. DEFense utilizes an iterative and modular approach to assess and mitigate various known vulnerabilities in the IC layout, which are targeting on sensitive active devices and wires. It is a flexible and extensible scripting framework without the need for modifications to commercial CAD flows, yet with the same high level of design quality. We have conducted extensive case studies on representative modern IC designs to “DEFend” layouts against Trojan insertion, probing, and crosstalk attacks. We are providing the framework to the community.
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 工程技术-工程:电子与电气
CiteScore
14.40
自引率
7.40%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6.5 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security covers the sciences, technologies, and applications relating to information forensics, information security, biometrics, surveillance and systems applications that incorporate these features
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