从进化博弈的角度看铁律的合理性

Qiaoying Lu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在《知识机器》一书中,迈克尔·斯特雷文斯挑战了科学方法的传统观点,捍卫了“解释的铁律”。这篇评论引入了进化博弈的视角来探讨铁律的出现和可持续性。在一群理论家中对理论竞争策略的动态建模表明,遵循铁律是否合理取决于一个人遇到铁律参与者的频率。研究表明,铁律追随者局部化网络的社会约束是其从哲学-争议均衡向科学-争议均衡过渡的关键因素。
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On the rationality of the iron rule from an evolutionary game perspective

In The Knowledge Machine, Michael Strevens challenges traditional views of the scientific method and defends the “iron rule of explanation.” This commentary introduces an evolutionary game perspective to explore the emergence and sustainability of the iron rule. Modeling the dynamics of theory-competing strategies in a population of theorists demonstrates that whether following the iron rule is rational depends on the frequency of iron-rule players one encounters. The study suggests that the social constraints of localized networks for iron-rule followers are critical factors in transitioning from a philosophical-dispute equilibrium to a scientific-dispute equilibrium.

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