反馈效应和系统风险暴露

IF 9.5 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-01-30 DOI:10.1111/jofi.13427
SNEHAL BANERJEE, BRADYN BREON-DRISH, KEVIN SMITH
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们建立了公司股票价格对暴露于系统性风险因素(如气候风险)的项目投资的“反馈效应”模型。股票价格反映了项目现金流及其贴现率的信息。追求现金流量最大化的管理者将折现率波动视为“噪音”,而追求价格最大化的管理者则将这种变化解读为项目净现值的信息。这种差异从性质上改变了投资行为随项目风险暴露的变化。此外,传统的目标(例如,现金流或价格最大化)不需要最大化福利,因为它们没有正确地考虑对冲和风险分担的投资收益。
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Feedback Effects and Systematic Risk Exposures

We model the “feedback effect” of a firm's stock price on investment in projects exposed to a systematic risk factor, like climate risk. The stock price reflects information about both the project's cash flows and its discount rate. A cash-flow-maximizing manager treats discount rate fluctuations as “noise,” but a price-maximizing manager interprets such variation as information about the project's net present value. This difference qualitatively changes how investment behavior varies with the project's risk exposure. Moreover, traditional objectives (e.g., cash flow or price maximization) need not maximize welfare because they do not correctly account for hedging and risk-sharing benefits of investment.

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来源期刊
Journal of Finance
Journal of Finance Multiple-
CiteScore
12.90
自引率
2.50%
发文量
88
期刊介绍: The Journal of Finance is a renowned publication that disseminates cutting-edge research across all major fields of financial inquiry. Widely regarded as the most cited academic journal in finance, each issue reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, government entities, and financial institutions worldwide. Published bi-monthly, the journal serves as the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization dedicated to advancing knowledge and understanding in financial economics. Join us in exploring the forefront of financial research and scholarship.
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