{"title":"Laih和Yen多重签名方案的改进。","authors":"Qi Xie, Xiu-yuan Yu","doi":"10.1631/jzus.2004.1155","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A new attack is proposed to show that a specified group of verifiers can cooperate to forge the signature for any message by secret key substitution due to the leaked secret key or by the group public key adjustment because of the renewed members. This paper presents the improvement scheme which overcomes the security weakness of Laih and Yen's scheme.</p>","PeriodicalId":85042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Zhejiang University. Science","volume":"5 9","pages":"1155-9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1631/jzus.2004.1155","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Improvement of Laih and Yen's multisignature scheme.\",\"authors\":\"Qi Xie, Xiu-yuan Yu\",\"doi\":\"10.1631/jzus.2004.1155\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>A new attack is proposed to show that a specified group of verifiers can cooperate to forge the signature for any message by secret key substitution due to the leaked secret key or by the group public key adjustment because of the renewed members. This paper presents the improvement scheme which overcomes the security weakness of Laih and Yen's scheme.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":85042,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Zhejiang University. Science\",\"volume\":\"5 9\",\"pages\":\"1155-9\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2004-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1631/jzus.2004.1155\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Zhejiang University. Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1631/jzus.2004.1155\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Zhejiang University. Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1631/jzus.2004.1155","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Improvement of Laih and Yen's multisignature scheme.
A new attack is proposed to show that a specified group of verifiers can cooperate to forge the signature for any message by secret key substitution due to the leaked secret key or by the group public key adjustment because of the renewed members. This paper presents the improvement scheme which overcomes the security weakness of Laih and Yen's scheme.