{"title":"税收对ceo竞争的影响。","authors":"Peter Krenn","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2016.1200477","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper contributes to the question of how taxation of corporate profits and wages affects competition among firms for highly skilled human resources such as CEOs. Use of a theoretical model shows that wage taxes can have a substantial impact on the outcome of such a competition if marginal tax rates are different as in an international labor market. Further, the paper shows that increasing the wage tax rate unilaterally can have an ambiguous effect on observed gross compensation levels. However, in a local labor market for CEOs, observed gross fixed salaries should decline in the wage tax rate. Tax effects in a market for CEOs is a particularly interesting topic because recent developments with respect to compensation practices of top-level managers have opened a public debate about the use of instruments for regulating compensation of those managers. Furthermore, many countries around the world use tax incentives in order to facilitate immigration of highly skilled human resources. The investigation follows an analytical economics-based approach by extending an LEN model with elements of competition for scarce human resources and income taxation. It investigates the impact of differential taxation on the competition between two firms for the exclusive service of a unique, highly skilled CEO.</p>","PeriodicalId":92145,"journal":{"name":"The European accounting review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09638180.2016.1200477","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Impact of Taxes on Competition for CEOs.\",\"authors\":\"Peter Krenn\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/09638180.2016.1200477\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>This paper contributes to the question of how taxation of corporate profits and wages affects competition among firms for highly skilled human resources such as CEOs. Use of a theoretical model shows that wage taxes can have a substantial impact on the outcome of such a competition if marginal tax rates are different as in an international labor market. Further, the paper shows that increasing the wage tax rate unilaterally can have an ambiguous effect on observed gross compensation levels. However, in a local labor market for CEOs, observed gross fixed salaries should decline in the wage tax rate. Tax effects in a market for CEOs is a particularly interesting topic because recent developments with respect to compensation practices of top-level managers have opened a public debate about the use of instruments for regulating compensation of those managers. Furthermore, many countries around the world use tax incentives in order to facilitate immigration of highly skilled human resources. The investigation follows an analytical economics-based approach by extending an LEN model with elements of competition for scarce human resources and income taxation. It investigates the impact of differential taxation on the competition between two firms for the exclusive service of a unique, highly skilled CEO.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":92145,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The European accounting review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-07-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09638180.2016.1200477\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The European accounting review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2016.1200477\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2017/7/11 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The European accounting review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2016.1200477","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2017/7/11 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper contributes to the question of how taxation of corporate profits and wages affects competition among firms for highly skilled human resources such as CEOs. Use of a theoretical model shows that wage taxes can have a substantial impact on the outcome of such a competition if marginal tax rates are different as in an international labor market. Further, the paper shows that increasing the wage tax rate unilaterally can have an ambiguous effect on observed gross compensation levels. However, in a local labor market for CEOs, observed gross fixed salaries should decline in the wage tax rate. Tax effects in a market for CEOs is a particularly interesting topic because recent developments with respect to compensation practices of top-level managers have opened a public debate about the use of instruments for regulating compensation of those managers. Furthermore, many countries around the world use tax incentives in order to facilitate immigration of highly skilled human resources. The investigation follows an analytical economics-based approach by extending an LEN model with elements of competition for scarce human resources and income taxation. It investigates the impact of differential taxation on the competition between two firms for the exclusive service of a unique, highly skilled CEO.