分析实用主义与通用LX词汇。

Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-08-24 DOI:10.1007/s11406-017-9866-4
Richard Samuels, Kevin Scharp
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摘要

在他最近的《约翰·洛克讲座》中——发表在《说与做之间》一书中——布兰顿扩展并完善了他关于语言和哲学本质的观点,提出了一种他称之为分析实用主义的观点。尽管Brandom的项目涉及了非常丰富的不同哲学问题,但我们在这里关注的是某些词汇在我们的语言实践中具有特权地位的论点,并且当充分理解时,这些词汇所处的实践可以帮助我们提供语义意向性的说明。布兰顿的说法是,这些词汇享有特权,因为它们是他所谓的通用LX词汇的一种——粗略地说,这些词汇的掌握是隐含在任何语言实践中的。我们表明,与Brandom的说法相反,逻辑词汇本身不能满足必须满足的条件,才能算作通用的LX词汇。此外,我们表明,完全类似的考虑削弱了他的主张,即模态词汇是普遍的LX。如果我们的论证是合理的,那么,与Brandom所坚持的相反,意向性不能被解释为“语用中介的语义现象”,至少不是他所提出的那种。
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Analytic Pragmatism and Universal LX Vocabulary.

In his recent John Locke Lectures - published as Between Saying and Doing - Brandom extends and refines his views on the nature of language and philosophy by developing a position that he calls Analytic Pragmatism. Although Brandom's project bears on an extraordinarily rich array of different philosophical issues, we focus here on the contention that certain vocabularies have a privileged status within our linguistic practices, and that when adequately understood, the practices in which these vocabularies figure can help furnish us with an account of semantic intentionality. Brandom's claim is that such vocabularies are privileged because they are a species of what he calls universal LX vocabulary -roughly, vocabulary whose mastery is implicit in any linguistic practice whatsoever. We show that, contrary to Brandom's claim, logical vocabulary per se fails to satisfy the conditions that must be met for something to count as universal LX vocabulary. Further, we show that exactly analogous considerations undermine his claim that modal vocabulary is universal LX. If our arguments are sound, then, contrary to what Brandom maintains, intentionality cannot be explicated as a "pragmatically mediated semantic phenomenon", at any rate not of the sort that he proposes.

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