对科恩反对替代可能性原则的回应,替代可能性原则是道德责任的充分而非必要。

Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-05-25 DOI:10.1007/s11406-017-9819-y
Garry Young
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引用次数: 3

摘要

在这篇论文中,我回应了Coren反对我2016年论文的论点,在该论文中,我们提出了一个替代可能性原则的案例,认为这对于道德责任的归属是充分的,但不是必要的(PAP(s))。我承认,Coren已经确定了我最初立场中容易受到反例影响的方面。尽管如此,通过对我最初论点的简单修正,我能够在不破坏我2016年论文基础的情况下回应这些反例。此外,我的论点是,Coren对我的原始论文提出的主要挑战涉及明确PAP(S)中已经隐含的内容。因此,尽管我承认我对PAP(S)的论点需要进一步澄清,但这是可以实现的(正如我在这里所展示的),而不会破坏我最初的立场。
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A Response to Coren's Objections to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility.

In this paper I respond to Coren's argument against my 2016 paper in which I present a case for the principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility (PAP(S)). I concede that Coren has identified aspects of my original position that are vulnerable to counter-examples. Nevertheless, through a simple amendment to my original argument I am able to respond to these counter-examples without undermining the foundations on which my 2016 paper was built. Moreover, it is my contention that the main challenge Coren presents to my original paper involves making explicit that which is already implied within PAP(S). Therefore, while I acknowledge that my argument for PAP(S) requires further clarification, this can be achieved (as I demonstrate here) without undermining my original position.

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