科学现实主义与专利制度。

David B Resnik
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引用次数: 3

摘要

专利制度似乎做出了三个形而上学的假设,通常与科学现实主义有关:存在一个独立于人类知识和技术的自然(即外部)世界;存在不可观察的实体(例如某些类型的发明);物体可以有因果关系。尽管对专利法的直接解读暗示了这些形而上学的承诺,但我们完全不清楚专利制度对世界的看法是否与科学实在论有任何关系。虽然现实主义者可能会接受专利制度明显的形而上学,作为对他们观点的额外支持,反现实主义者可能会提出一种不涉及现实主义形而上学承诺的专利法的替代解释。因此,关于专利制度形而上学的问题取决于一个人是否从表面上看待专利法,还是捍卫由哲学理论驱动的专利法解释。然而,科学哲学家应该关注专利的实践,即使他们最终拒绝专利制度表面上的形而上学,并提供另一种解释。
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Scientific Realism and the Patent System.

The patent system appears to make three metaphysical assumptions often associated with scientific realism: there is a natural (i.e. external) world that is independent of human knowledge and technology; unobservable entities (such as some types of inventions) exist; and objects can have causal powers. Although a straightforward reading of patent laws implies these metaphysical commitments, it is not at all clear that what the patent system has to say about the world has any bearing on issues of scientific realism. While realists might embrace the patent system's apparent metaphysics as providing additional support for their view, anti-realists could propose an alternative interpretation of patent law that does not involve realist metaphysical commitments. Thus, questions about the patent system's metaphysics depend on whether one takes patent law at face value or defends an interpretation of patent law motivated by philosophical theory. Nevertheless, philosophers of science should pay attention to the practice of patenting, even if they ultimately reject the patent system's apparent metaphysics and offer an alternative interpretation.

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