谁害怕对抗?论证中的冲突与合作。

IF 1.3 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 Epub Date: 2020-12-23 DOI:10.1007/s11245-020-09736-9
Catarina Dutilh Novaes
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引用次数: 9

摘要

至少自20世纪80年代以来,对抗性在论证中的作用在不同的领域得到了广泛的讨论。从表面上看,在这个问题上似乎有两个极端的立场:辩论不应该(至少在理想情况下)是对抗性的,因为我们应该始终以合作的辩论参与为目标;鉴于对抗性(当适当地概念化时)是论证的内在属性,论证应该而且实际上总是对抗性的。我在这里捍卫的观点是,论证的具体实例在不同程度上是(也应该是)对抗或合作的。决定辩论情境主要是对抗性还是合作性的是辩论情境本身之外的语境特征和背景条件,特别是涉及的各方在多大程度上具有先前冲突或其他趋同的利益。为了进一步发展这一观点,我考虑了三种经常与论证相关的终极目标:认知终极目标、建立共识终极目标和冲突管理终极目标。我首先简要讨论对抗性、合作和冲突的概念。然后,我概述了最近关于辩论中的对抗性的文献中辩论的主线。接下来,我依次讨论上面列出的三种论证的目的性,强调对抗性和合作的作用。
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Who's Afraid of Adversariality? Conflict and Cooperation in Argumentation.

Since at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in argumentation has been extensively discussed within different domains. Prima facie, there seem to be two extreme positions on this issue: argumentation should (ideally at least) never be adversarial, as we should always aim for cooperative argumentative engagement; argumentation should be and in fact is always adversarial, given that adversariality (when suitably conceptualized) is an intrinsic property of argumentation. I here defend the view that specific instances of argumentation are (and should be) adversarial or cooperative to different degrees. What determines whether an argumentative situation should be primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative are contextual features and background conditions external to the argumentative situation itself, in particular the extent to which the parties involved have prior conflicting or else convergent interests. To further develop this claim, I consider three teloi that are frequently associated with argumentation: the epistemic telos, the consensus-building telos, and the conflict management telos. I start with a brief discussion of the concepts of adversariality, cooperation, and conflict in general. I then sketch the main lines of the debates in the recent literature on adversariality in argumentation. Next, I discuss the three teloi of argumentation listed above in turn, emphasizing the roles of adversariality and cooperation for each of them.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
7.10%
发文量
47
期刊介绍: Topoi''s main assumption is that philosophy is a lively, provocative, delightful activity, which constantly challenges our received views, relentlessly questions our inherited habits, painstakingly elaborates on how things could be different, in other stories, in counterfactual situations, in alternative possible worlds. Whatever its ideology, whether with the intent of uncovering a truer structure of reality or of soothing our anxiety, of exposing myths or of following them through, the outcome of philosophical activity is always the destabilizing, unsettling generation of doubts, of objections, of criticisms. It follows that this activity is intrinsically a ''dialogue'', that philosophy is first and foremost philosophical discussion, that it requires bringing out conflicting points of view, paying careful, sympathetic attention to their structure, and using this dialectic to articulate one''s approach, to make it richer, more thoughtful, more open to variation and play. And it follows that the spirit which one brings to this activity must be one of tolerance, of always suspecting one''s own blindness and consequently looking with unbiased eye in every corner, without fearing to pass a (fallible) judgment on what is there but also without failing to show interest and respect. Topoi''s structure is a direct expression of this view. To maximize discussion, we devote most or all of this issue to a single topic. And, since discussion is only interesting when it is conducted seriously and responsibly, we usually request the collaboration of a guest-editor, an expert who will identify contributors and interact with them in a constructive way. Because we do not feel tied to any definite philosophical theme (or set of them), we choose the topic with absolute freedom, looking for what is blossoming and thriving, occasionally betting on what might - partly through our attention - ''begin'' to blossom and thrive. And because we do not want our structur e to become our own straightjacket, we are open to contributions not fitting the ''topos'', and do not rule out in principle the possibility of topic-less issues.
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