{"title":"大流行中的公共理性:约翰·罗尔斯论新冠肺炎时代的真相","authors":"Calvin H Warner","doi":"10.1007/s11406-021-00459-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In \"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,\" John Rawls suggests an approach to a public conception of justice that eschews any dependence on metaphysical conceptions of justice in favor of a political conception of justice. This means that if there is a metaphysical conception of justice that actually obtains, then Rawls' theory would not (and could not) be sensitive to it. Rawls himself admitted in Political Liberalism that \"the political conception does without the truth.\" Similarly, in Law of Peoples, Rawls endorses a political conception of justice to govern the society of peoples that is not concerned with truth, but instead concerned with being sufficiently neutral so as to avoid conflict with any reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The odd result is that this neutrality excludes any conception of truth at all. Therefore, in times of crisis that demand incisive decision making based on scientific, economic or moral considerations, public reason will stall because it can contain no coherent conception of truth.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"50 3","pages":"1503-1513"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8801277/pdf/","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\" Public Reason in a Pandemic: John Rawls on Truth in the Age of COVID-19.\",\"authors\":\"Calvin H Warner\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11406-021-00459-8\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>In \\\"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,\\\" John Rawls suggests an approach to a public conception of justice that eschews any dependence on metaphysical conceptions of justice in favor of a political conception of justice. This means that if there is a metaphysical conception of justice that actually obtains, then Rawls' theory would not (and could not) be sensitive to it. Rawls himself admitted in Political Liberalism that \\\"the political conception does without the truth.\\\" Similarly, in Law of Peoples, Rawls endorses a political conception of justice to govern the society of peoples that is not concerned with truth, but instead concerned with being sufficiently neutral so as to avoid conflict with any reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The odd result is that this neutrality excludes any conception of truth at all. Therefore, in times of crisis that demand incisive decision making based on scientific, economic or moral considerations, public reason will stall because it can contain no coherent conception of truth.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":74436,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)\",\"volume\":\"50 3\",\"pages\":\"1503-1513\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8801277/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00459-8\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2022/1/31 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00459-8","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2022/1/31 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Public Reason in a Pandemic: John Rawls on Truth in the Age of COVID-19.
In "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," John Rawls suggests an approach to a public conception of justice that eschews any dependence on metaphysical conceptions of justice in favor of a political conception of justice. This means that if there is a metaphysical conception of justice that actually obtains, then Rawls' theory would not (and could not) be sensitive to it. Rawls himself admitted in Political Liberalism that "the political conception does without the truth." Similarly, in Law of Peoples, Rawls endorses a political conception of justice to govern the society of peoples that is not concerned with truth, but instead concerned with being sufficiently neutral so as to avoid conflict with any reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The odd result is that this neutrality excludes any conception of truth at all. Therefore, in times of crisis that demand incisive decision making based on scientific, economic or moral considerations, public reason will stall because it can contain no coherent conception of truth.