反驳道格拉斯和埃利奥特。

Robert Hudson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在《我们应该努力使科学无偏见吗?对可重复性危机的哲学评估》一文中,我认为如果我们听从希瑟-道格拉斯(Heather Douglas)和凯文-埃利奥特(Kevin C. Elliott)的建议,在科学假说的证据评估中引入非认识论的价值,那么科学中的偏见问题(当前可重复性危机的一个关键因素)就会恶化。道格拉斯和埃利奥特在回应我的论文时,抱怨我歪曲了他们的观点,是各种混淆的受害者。在这篇反驳文章中,我通过对他们发表的观点进行研究,认为我最初对他们工作的解释是准确的,而且在他们手中,科学一般容易偏离真理。
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Rebuttal to Douglas and Elliott.

In "Should We Strive to Make Science Bias‑Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis", I argue that the problem of bias in science, a key factor in the current reproducibility crisis, is worsened if we follow Heather Douglas and Kevin C. Elliott's advice and introduce non-epistemic values into the evidential assessment of scientific hypotheses. In their response to my paper, Douglas and Elliott complain that I misrepresent their views and fall victim to various confusions. In this rebuttal I argue, by means of an examination of their published views, that my initial interpretation of their work is accurate and that, in their hands, science is generally prone to deviations from truth.

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