The body of law: boundaries, extensions, and the human right to physical integrity in the biotechnical age.

The body is precondition of human existence and reference point of many legal norms. But the law only rarely asks what the body is more precisely. Answers might appear evident, but commonsensical conceptions of the body have been cast into doubt by feminists, artists, and disability theorists. Drawing on polyphonic arguments, they suggest social or post-human reconceptualizations with potential legal implications. Civil rights activists call for better protection of cyborg bodies; some legal scholars suggest redefining or even dismissing the right to bodily integrity because of its uncertain foundations. Of particular importance is the question of the boundaries of the body because the legal treatment of prostheses and assistive devices depends on whether they are part of it. This paper analyzes these boundaries with a focus on the right to bodily integrity, in light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the foundational legal distinction between persons and things. It argues that bodies indeed have multiple boundaries, but none of them qualifies for legal purposes. The law must thus draw normative boundaries. Against the temper of times, it should resort to a naturalistic conception because it accommodates interests of stakeholders in the best way.