强烈的认知主义弱点

IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-03-11 DOI:10.1111/phib.12252
Nathan Hauthaler
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引用次数: 0

摘要

丸š我ć,Schwenkler(分析哲学,59,309)为关于意图的强认知主义提供了一个简单而优雅的辩护:对φ的意图是一种人们将φ的信念形式。我表明他们的辩护是失败的:无论多么简单和优雅,它都无法解释意图及其表达的各个方面,并且面临着自己的独特挑战,包括困境和反例。这些也破坏了Marušić &Schwenkler提出了一种最佳解释类型的解释,并推荐了一种替代强认知主义的方法。
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Strong cognitivist weaknesses

Marušić & Schwenkler (Analytic Philosophy, 59, 309) offer a simple and elegant defense of strong cognitivism about intention: the view that an intention to φ is a form of belief that one will φ. I show that their defense fails: however simple and elegant, it fails to account for various aspects about intention and its expression, and faces distinctive challenges of its own, including a dilemma and counterexample. These also undermine Marušić & Schwenkler's claim to a best-explanation type of account and recommend alternatives to strong cognitivism altogether.

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来源期刊
Analytic Philosophy
Analytic Philosophy PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
34
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