The China paradox: the endogenous relationship between law and economic growth

Abstract An enduring paradox of China’s remarkable economic growth is the lack of a well-established legal system. By drawing on the credibility thesis, this paper proposes that legal and economic reforms give rise to, and reinforce, the other and the market is underpinned by evolving institutions that are shaped by the expectations of the actors in the economy. It is thus not the form of institutions but their function that is more important in assessing institutional performance. A comparative examination of the USA at a similar stage of legal-institutional development to China provides support for an evolutionary, endogenous process. This institutional analysis will focus on key issues of economic legislation, such as corporate law, patent law and securities. Analyzing the relationship as complementary processes can help explain the paradox of strong economic growth within an under-developed system of law with potential, critical implications for institutional development in other countries.