The Indian Test and the Nuclear Game Rules

Introduction I t is possible to argue that India’s nuclear strategy seems to have changed, but this does not necessarily at present mean a change in the fundamentals of India’s nuclear policy as these were outlined in the late 1940s and the 1950s. The nuclear test appears to have damaged the NPT, and the test implies a re-orientation in India’s relations with China and the Super Powers. One may speculate about the effect of the test on Asian politics and suggest an emerging relationship—a broadening of the security dialogue—between SALT and NPT approaches to security. The premises in this argument are as follows: (i) SALT II, like SALT I, is not likely to cut deeply into the arm race and (ii) the Soviet American and the Sino-Soviet balances are stable, i.e. the conflicts are manageable. Given their premises, there are likely to be growing challenges against Super Poweroriented approaches to security by third parties like India. For instance, India does not think that the nuclear business is the exclusive privilege of the advanced industrialized States. In other words, political and commercial motives are also coming into the foreground. In the 1960s the arm control dialogue was not in fact shaped by disarmament ideals—although governments spoke the language of disarmament. Today, as in the 1960s, arms control deals essentially with security concerns but in the 1970s, ‘security’ emphasizes, or makes explicit, the political motives.