{"title":"自我实现的信念:一种防御","authors":"Paul Silva","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2172594","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Self-fulfilling beliefs are, in at least some cases, a kind of belief that is rational to form and hold in the absence of evidence. The rationality of such beliefs have significant implications for a range of debates in epistemology. Most startlingly, it undermines the idea that having strong evidence for the truth of p is necessary for it to be rational to believe p . The rationality of self-fulfilling beliefs is here defended against the idea that their rationality is incompatible with a compelling closure principle.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: A Defence\",\"authors\":\"Paul Silva\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/00048402.2023.2172594\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Self-fulfilling beliefs are, in at least some cases, a kind of belief that is rational to form and hold in the absence of evidence. The rationality of such beliefs have significant implications for a range of debates in epistemology. Most startlingly, it undermines the idea that having strong evidence for the truth of p is necessary for it to be rational to believe p . The rationality of self-fulfilling beliefs is here defended against the idea that their rationality is incompatible with a compelling closure principle.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51459,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-02-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2172594\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2172594","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Self-fulfilling beliefs are, in at least some cases, a kind of belief that is rational to form and hold in the absence of evidence. The rationality of such beliefs have significant implications for a range of debates in epistemology. Most startlingly, it undermines the idea that having strong evidence for the truth of p is necessary for it to be rational to believe p . The rationality of self-fulfilling beliefs is here defended against the idea that their rationality is incompatible with a compelling closure principle.
期刊介绍：
The Australasian Journal of Philosophy (AJP) is one of the world''s leading philosophy journals. Founded in 1923, it has been continuously published ever since. It is recognized as one of the best in the analytic tradition, but is not narrow in what it regards as worthy of acceptance. Heavily cited in the general philosophical literature, it is covered by all the major abstracting and indexing services, including the Arts and Humanities Citation Index® which provides access to current and retrospective bibliographic information and cited references found in the world''s leading arts and humanities journals. In addition to Articles and Discussion Notes, the journal publishes Book Reviews and Book Notes as well as occasional commissioned Critical Notices. The journal is read world-wide and has recently published contributions from North and South American, European and Asian as well as Australasian authors.
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