州多成员区的战略行为:派出一名候选人是否具有显著优势?

IF 1.4 3区 社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-11-17 DOI:10.1111/lsq.12363
Julia Marin Hellwege, Ed Gerrish
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在美国的一些州,众议院的立法区是由两名或两名以上的议员组成的多议员区(MMD)。十个州使用MMDs,最常见的形式是一个地区选举两名候选人(受雇于AZ, ND, NJ, SD)。有时,这些州的政党在他们在登记方面处于劣势的地区只派出一名强有力的候选人,认为这种“一次机会”策略可以提高选举几率。我们的研究对这种策略表示怀疑。研究发现,在三个州的汇总样本中,民主党人的优势明显不足,选举差距平均扩大了3.3个百分点,这意味着政党最好选择两名候选人,而不管他们的相对素质如何。然而,这种影响因州而异。共和党人并没有处于劣势,尽管很少有倾向民主党的州采用这种选举方法。本研究对MMD州的政党策略具有实际意义。
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Strategic Behavior in State Multimember Districts: Does Fielding One Candidate offer a Notable Advantage?

In several U.S. states, legislative districts for the lower chamber are structured as multi-member districts (MMD) electing two or more individuals. Ten states use MMDs, the most common form is a district that elects two candidates (employed in AZ, ND, NJ, SD). Sometimes, parties in these states field only one strong candidate in districts where they have a registration disadvantage, believing this “single shot” strategy improves the election odds. Our research casts doubt on this tactic. It finds that lone Democrats in a pooled sample of three states see a noted disadvantage by widening the electoral gap by 3.3 percentage points on average, meaning that parties are better off running two candidates regardless of their relative quality. However, this effect varies within states. Republicans do not experience a disadvantage, though fewer Democratic-leaning states employ this election method. This research has practical implications for party strategy in MMD states.

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来源期刊
Legislative Studies Quarterly
Legislative Studies Quarterly POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
13.30%
发文量
36
期刊介绍: The Legislative Studies Quarterly is an international journal devoted to the publication of research on representative assemblies. Its purpose is to disseminate scholarly work on parliaments and legislatures, their relations to other political institutions, their functions in the political system, and the activities of their members both within the institution and outside. Contributions are invited from scholars in all countries. The pages of the Quarterly are open to all research approaches consistent with the normal canons of scholarship, and to work on representative assemblies in all settings and all time periods. The aim of the journal is to contribute to the formulation and verification of general theories about legislative systems, processes, and behavior.
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