强化董事会监督、投资者保护与部门信息披露质量:来自欧盟的证据

IF 4.6 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Accounting in Europe Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI:10.1080/17449480.2019.1646427
Sameh Kobbi-Fakhfakh, R. Shabou, Benoît Pigé
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引用次数: 3

摘要

摘要本研究考察了强化董事会监督(IBM)与分部披露质量(SDQ)之间的关系。它还调查了这种关联是否可以通过公司的母国投资者保护(IP)水平来调节。本文以2007-2012年271家非金融类欧盟上市公司为样本,估计了行业固定效应和年度固定效应两种多元回归模型。我们发现,当大多数外部董事担任监督委员会成员时,分部披露质量更高。我们还发现,在知识产权环境较弱的公司中,IBM和SDQ之间的正相关关系更为明显,而在知识产权环境较强的公司中则不那么明显。因此,我们提供了支持IBM和IP级别之间的替代关系的证据,就它们与SDQ的关联而言。几个稳健性测试证明了我们的发现。
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Intensive Board Monitoring, Investor Protection and Segment Disclosure Quality: Evidence from EU
Abstract This study examined the association between intensive board monitoring (IBM) and segment disclosure quality (SDQ). It also investigated whether this association can be moderated by firm's home country investor protection (IP) level. Based on a panel of 271 non-financial European Union (EU) listed corporations covering the 2007–2012 period, this study estimated two multiple regression models including industry and year fixed effects. We found evidence that the segment disclosure quality is higher when a majority of outside directors serve on monitoring committees. We, also, found that the positive association between IBM and SDQ is more pronounced for firms in a weak IP environment and less pronounced for firms in a strong IP environment. Thus, we provided evidence in favor of a substitutive relationship between IBM and IP level with respect to their association with SDQ. Our findings are evidenced by several robustness tests.
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来源期刊
Accounting in Europe
Accounting in Europe BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
7.10%
发文量
14
期刊最新文献
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