{"title":"追踪定律。穆罕默德·贾迈·哈菲兹·拜格和约旦英语。[新南威尔士州亚历山大:联邦出版社,2021年。xxi+276页,精装180.00美元。ISBN 978-1-76002-306-5。]","authors":"Derek Whayman","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000587","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"1990s) is one where comparativists like Legrand have broken free of the authority paradigm. And so, what Fekete claims to be doing is applying a “light” version of Kuhn’s theory, thus avoiding the problem of incommensurability between competing paradigms. What Kuhn offers, says Fekete, is “a conceptual vocabulary to tame the complexity of scholarly development” (p. 164). Yet it is not evident that he really needs this vocabulary. His five “paradigm” periods would be just as understandable if he were to use the vocabulary of social science – programmes, schemes of intelligibility, poles and orientations – and it (they) would surely suffice as a framework for his excellent discussion of the comparatists he regards as key in the history of comparative law. To employ Kuhn suggests that law is a science in the natural science meaning of the term; this is something that a good many comparatists would not just contest but see as very dangerous.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"684 - 687"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Law of Tracing. By Mohammud Jaamae Hafeez-Baig and Jordan English. [Alexandria, NSW: The Federation Press, 2021. xxi + 276 pp. Hardback $180.00. ISBN 978-1-76002-306-5.]\",\"authors\":\"Derek Whayman\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/S0008197322000587\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"1990s) is one where comparativists like Legrand have broken free of the authority paradigm. And so, what Fekete claims to be doing is applying a “light” version of Kuhn’s theory, thus avoiding the problem of incommensurability between competing paradigms. What Kuhn offers, says Fekete, is “a conceptual vocabulary to tame the complexity of scholarly development” (p. 164). Yet it is not evident that he really needs this vocabulary. His five “paradigm” periods would be just as understandable if he were to use the vocabulary of social science – programmes, schemes of intelligibility, poles and orientations – and it (they) would surely suffice as a framework for his excellent discussion of the comparatists he regards as key in the history of comparative law. To employ Kuhn suggests that law is a science in the natural science meaning of the term; this is something that a good many comparatists would not just contest but see as very dangerous.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46389,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Cambridge Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"81 1\",\"pages\":\"684 - 687\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Cambridge Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000587\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cambridge Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000587","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Law of Tracing. By Mohammud Jaamae Hafeez-Baig and Jordan English. [Alexandria, NSW: The Federation Press, 2021. xxi + 276 pp. Hardback $180.00. ISBN 978-1-76002-306-5.]
1990s) is one where comparativists like Legrand have broken free of the authority paradigm. And so, what Fekete claims to be doing is applying a “light” version of Kuhn’s theory, thus avoiding the problem of incommensurability between competing paradigms. What Kuhn offers, says Fekete, is “a conceptual vocabulary to tame the complexity of scholarly development” (p. 164). Yet it is not evident that he really needs this vocabulary. His five “paradigm” periods would be just as understandable if he were to use the vocabulary of social science – programmes, schemes of intelligibility, poles and orientations – and it (they) would surely suffice as a framework for his excellent discussion of the comparatists he regards as key in the history of comparative law. To employ Kuhn suggests that law is a science in the natural science meaning of the term; this is something that a good many comparatists would not just contest but see as very dangerous.
期刊介绍:
The Cambridge Law Journal publishes articles on all aspects of law. Special emphasis is placed on contemporary developments, but the journal''s range includes jurisprudence and legal history. An important feature of the journal is the Case and Comment section, in which members of the Cambridge Law Faculty and other distinguished contributors analyse recent judicial decisions, new legislation and current law reform proposals. The articles and case notes are designed to have the widest appeal to those interested in the law - whether as practitioners, students, teachers, judges or administrators - and to provide an opportunity for them to keep abreast of new ideas and the progress of legal reform. Each issue also contains an extensive section of book reviews.