{"title":"希尔伯特形式主义程序的一些启示","authors":"J. Dadaczyński","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0019","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Hilbert’s program of formalism was undoubtedly a result of many mathematical, logical, and philosophical factors. The aim of this paper is to indicate some rarely highlighted contexts. One important goal of Hilbert’s program was to prove the consistency of arithmetic. The paper shows that Hilbert did not begin the study of this issue only after the discovery of Russell’s paradox. The issue of the consistency of the arithmetic of real numbers was associated with the discovery — by Burali-Forti and Cantor — of the first set-theoretical antinomy, i.e. the antinomy of the greatest ordinal number. Hilbert, already in 1899, asked whether the set of real numbers — to use Cantor’s terminology — was a consistent collection. He then raised the issue of the consistency of the arithmetic of natural numbers in 1904, after the discovery of Russell’s paradox. Fundamental for Hilbert’s mature program of formalism was the distinction between the finitistic and the infinitisticmathematics. The paper points out that the source of this distinction can be found in Brouwer’s proof-theoretical and constructivist criticism of certain theorems of the classical logic. So significant was the criticism that Hilbert had to take it into account in his formalistic reconstruction of classical mathematics. The result was precisely his distinction between the finitistic and the infinitistic mathematics.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2018-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"O niektórych inspiracjach Hilbertowskiego programu formalizmu\",\"authors\":\"J. Dadaczyński\",\"doi\":\"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0019\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Hilbert’s program of formalism was undoubtedly a result of many mathematical, logical, and philosophical factors. The aim of this paper is to indicate some rarely highlighted contexts. One important goal of Hilbert’s program was to prove the consistency of arithmetic. The paper shows that Hilbert did not begin the study of this issue only after the discovery of Russell’s paradox. The issue of the consistency of the arithmetic of real numbers was associated with the discovery — by Burali-Forti and Cantor — of the first set-theoretical antinomy, i.e. the antinomy of the greatest ordinal number. Hilbert, already in 1899, asked whether the set of real numbers — to use Cantor’s terminology — was a consistent collection. He then raised the issue of the consistency of the arithmetic of natural numbers in 1904, after the discovery of Russell’s paradox. Fundamental for Hilbert’s mature program of formalism was the distinction between the finitistic and the infinitisticmathematics. The paper points out that the source of this distinction can be found in Brouwer’s proof-theoretical and constructivist criticism of certain theorems of the classical logic. So significant was the criticism that Hilbert had to take it into account in his formalistic reconstruction of classical mathematics. The result was precisely his distinction between the finitistic and the infinitistic mathematics.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41424,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Filozofia Nauki\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-10-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Filozofia Nauki\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0019\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Filozofia Nauki","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0019","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
O niektórych inspiracjach Hilbertowskiego programu formalizmu
Hilbert’s program of formalism was undoubtedly a result of many mathematical, logical, and philosophical factors. The aim of this paper is to indicate some rarely highlighted contexts. One important goal of Hilbert’s program was to prove the consistency of arithmetic. The paper shows that Hilbert did not begin the study of this issue only after the discovery of Russell’s paradox. The issue of the consistency of the arithmetic of real numbers was associated with the discovery — by Burali-Forti and Cantor — of the first set-theoretical antinomy, i.e. the antinomy of the greatest ordinal number. Hilbert, already in 1899, asked whether the set of real numbers — to use Cantor’s terminology — was a consistent collection. He then raised the issue of the consistency of the arithmetic of natural numbers in 1904, after the discovery of Russell’s paradox. Fundamental for Hilbert’s mature program of formalism was the distinction between the finitistic and the infinitisticmathematics. The paper points out that the source of this distinction can be found in Brouwer’s proof-theoretical and constructivist criticism of certain theorems of the classical logic. So significant was the criticism that Hilbert had to take it into account in his formalistic reconstruction of classical mathematics. The result was precisely his distinction between the finitistic and the infinitistic mathematics.
期刊介绍:
Filozofia Nauki (The Philosophy of Science) is a double-blind peer-reviewed academic quarterly published by the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw. It publishes articles, notes, and reviews covering the whole range of analytic philosophy, including among others: epistemology, ontology, general philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mathematics, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences, experimental philosophy. We invite papers not only from professional philosophers but also from specialists in different areas, interested in generalizing their scientific experiences towards more foundational issues.