行政自主权

IF 0.7 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW University of Toronto Law Journal Pub Date : 2023-09-22 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.4373554
P. Daly
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要:法官罗莎莉·阿贝拉与尊重行政决策者密切相关。我认为她毕恭毕敬的态度是多方面的,比通常想象的要复杂得多。Abella J的行政法判例既涉及司法尊重,也涉及行政自治。在一个层面上,Abella J的判例是一种司法克制的判例,宣扬对行政程序的有限司法监督。这反映了将行政法中的尊重视为需要司法约束的学说的传统思维方式:它是保护行政决策者免受司法干预的盾牌。因此,她支持尊重行政决策者的广泛推定,并阐述了一个相当不干涉的合理性审查概念。但是,在更深层次上,Abella J的判例更为激进。正如我所解释的,Abella J并不是简单地致力于对司法审查采取克制的方法,而是致力于促进公共行政的自主权:她向行政决策者提供了剑,使他们能够开辟更多的空间来运作和阐明法律规范的适用版本。她对行政自治的承诺,而不仅仅是对司法约束的承诺,促使人们反思Abella J的行政法哲学的基础,这最终必须建立在她对行政程序的信任之上,使她与与进步思想家相关的所谓“功能主义”思想流派保持一致。然后,我转向加拿大最高法院最近在瓦维洛夫案中重新阐述加拿大行政法——Abella J对此表示坚决反对。我反思了为什么多数派和Abella J在瓦维洛夫产生分歧,并认为Abella J法学的关键特征——克制和自治——植根于一种已经失宠的行政法思维模式。
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The Autonomy of Administration
Abstract:Justice Rosalie Abella is closely associated with deference to administrative decision makers. I will argue that her deferential approach was multifaceted, much more sophisticated than might typically be assumed. Abella J's administrative law jurisprudence is as much about administrative autonomy as it is about judicial deference. On one level, Abella J's jurisprudence is a jurisprudence of judicial restraint, preaching limited judicial oversight of the administrative process. This reflects the conventional way of thinking about deference in administrative law as a doctrine requiring judicial restraint: it is a shield protecting administrative decision makers from judicial interference. Accordingly, she supported a broad presumption of deference to administrative decision makers and articulated a fairly non-interventionist conception of reasonableness review. But, on a deeper level, Abella J's jurisprudence is more radical. As I explain, Abella J was not committed simply to a restrained approach to judicial review but, rather, to promoting the autonomy of public administration: she furnished swords to administrative decision makers, allowing them to carve out additional space in which to operate and articulate applied versions of legal norms. Her commitment to administrative autonomy, rather than simply to judicial restraint, prompts reflection about the basis of Abella J's administrative law philosophy, which must ultimately be grounded in her trust of the administrative process, aligning her with the so-called 'functionalist' school of thought associated with progressive thinkers. I then turn to the Supreme Court of Canada's recent rearticulation of Canadian administrative law in the Vavilov case–a rearticulation with which Abella J expressed firm disagreement. I reflect on why the majority and Abella J diverged in Vavilov and suggest that the key features of Abella J's jurisprudence–restraint and autonomy–are rooted in a mode of thinking about administrative law that has fallen out of favour.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
16.70%
发文量
26
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