命令与说服:历史上的犯罪、法律和国家。:麻省理工学院出版社,2021。480页。34.95美元(hbk);$24.95 (pbk) ISBN: 9780262045629;9780262546027

Q2 Social Sciences Howard Journal of Crime and Justice Pub Date : 2022-12-12 DOI:10.1111/hojo.12500
Simon Devereaux
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Baldwin has certainly consulted a lot of scholarship.</p><p>The broad assertions of this book will not strike any reasonably well-informed historian of criminal justice as overly surprising. Over several millennia, Baldwin tells us, sin and crime – once seen as essentially indistinguishable – have come to be defined, far more rigorously, as distinctive categories of human behaviour. Much of the reason for this involves the advent of state power. Where once human beings relied upon divine intervention for the enforcement of moral and social norms, increasingly that task has fallen to the state. Early regimes, which were authoritarian in character, relied upon occasional examples of extreme penal severity – breaking on the wheel, decapitation, hangings on a sometimes enormous scale, and so forth – to deter potential wrongdoers. As states grew more democratic and humane, so too did the formal character of their penal sanctions. 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Baldwin has certainly consulted a lot of scholarship.</p><p>The broad assertions of this book will not strike any reasonably well-informed historian of criminal justice as overly surprising. Over several millennia, Baldwin tells us, sin and crime – once seen as essentially indistinguishable – have come to be defined, far more rigorously, as distinctive categories of human behaviour. Much of the reason for this involves the advent of state power. Where once human beings relied upon divine intervention for the enforcement of moral and social norms, increasingly that task has fallen to the state. Early regimes, which were authoritarian in character, relied upon occasional examples of extreme penal severity – breaking on the wheel, decapitation, hangings on a sometimes enormous scale, and so forth – to deter potential wrongdoers. As states grew more democratic and humane, so too did the formal character of their penal sanctions. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

40年前,当丹尼尔•布尔斯廷(Daniel Boorstin, 1983)出版了他现在已成为经典的通俗历史著作《发现者》(The discoverers)时,《时代》杂志上一位持怀疑态度的评论家说,这本书读起来就像一个人在赶公交车的时候,装满了松散笔记的手提箱突然被打开了。在阅读彼得·鲍德温(Peter Baldwin)对有记载的人类历史上的犯罪、法律、惩罚和治安进行的雄心勃勃的新调查时,我有时也会产生一种类似的感觉。这本书有很多值得欣赏和欣赏的地方,尤其是次要参考文献的规模和范围惊人:近1800条注释覆盖了书的最后78页。鲍德温当然请教过很多学者。这本书的广泛主张不会让任何一个相当见多识广的刑事司法历史学家感到过于惊讶。鲍德温告诉我们,几千年来,罪恶和犯罪——曾经被视为本质上无法区分的——已经被更严格地定义为人类行为的不同类别。这在很大程度上与国家权力的出现有关。人类曾经依靠神的干预来执行道德和社会规范,但现在这项任务越来越多地落到了国家身上。早期的独裁政权,依靠偶尔的极端严厉的刑罚来震慑潜在的违法者,比如踩车轮、斩首、有时是大规模的绞刑等等。随着国家变得更加民主和人道,其刑事制裁的正式性质也随之改变。非致命刑罚的出现,特别是流放、罚款和最后的大规模监禁,使国家放弃了早期对死刑和其他身体折磨方式的依赖。事实上,自19世纪初以来,专业化的警务——如今受到现代技术提供的非凡监视能力的关键支持,以及纸币和硬币的大量废弃——使各国能够采取越来越严格和有效的手段,从一开始就预防犯罪的发生。在发达国家的许多地方,一个人可以一辈子不被抢劫或入室盗窃。如果这一切的总体趋势听起来广泛而令人放心的人性化,那么其中也存在着一种专制的悖论。就在现代社会激发人们更广泛、更深入地遵守社会规范的能力已经站稳脚跟的同时,随着国家的强制性能力达到前所未有的水平,刑事犯罪的绝对数量也在增加。1875年只有8页的美国联邦刑法,如今已达到近900页(第22页)。大约40%的新法规是在1970年之后的四分之一个世纪里制定的(第348页),这是20世纪60年代文化冲击和普遍感觉的一个令人沮丧的证据,特别是在美国,社会处于崩溃的边缘,当代世界无处不在的电子媒体维持了这种信念。曾经,由于缺乏能力,国家只惩罚少数罪行,而西方世界80%以上的罪犯都以某种方式受到惩罚(第265页)。人类变得越文明,他们似乎就越全面地期望既有权威来规范和压制违法行为。任何可能发生的暴力行为通常都是可以容忍的,因为绝大多数人天生遵纪守法,除了偶尔违反交通规则外,很少在任何情况下遇到警察。如今,只有一小部分人能感受到国家权力最尖锐的边缘,他们发现自己在社会、经济、甚至地理上都被全面边缘化。鲍德温讲故事的范围非常广泛,他善于提供生动的例子和引人注目的概括。然而,作为一名专业的历史学家,我有时会想知道解释和分析的细节,尤其是年代学和地理变化。鲍德温经常在一到两页的篇幅里,在古代世界、中世纪和现代早期、18、19和20世纪之间自由地来回穿梭,也跨越了许多国家和文化的界限。记录笔记的广度,以及为支持一般观点而整理笔记的雄心,有时令人敬畏。然而,因果关系往往很难辨别,更不用说特定发展在不同时间和地点的变化方式了——以及它们为什么会这样。像这样的书常常因为提供了跨越时间和空间的“比较”视角而受到赞赏。鲍德温的风格更多的是在性格上的累积,而不是真正的对比。并非所有人都认为这种方法有问题。众所周知,“聪明但无知的读者”会遇到大量有趣和有启发性的信息。 直到最后一章,鲍德温才摆出他的分析牌。经典的历史和社会学观点,最著名的是诺伯特·埃利亚斯(2000)的“文明过程”,将社会行为和国家监管的演变追溯到中世纪晚期,而米歇尔·福柯则专注于18世纪中叶以来的“启蒙运动”及其矛盾。鲍德温的时间和地理范围要大得多。对他来说,社会化的过程——现代社会的核心粘合剂——在狩猎采集者开始形成稳定的定居社区时就开始了。国家本身是所有这一切的后来者。这是一个引人注目的、具有启发性的概念框架,尽管受过传统训练的历史学家可能会与本文的评论员一样,本能地抵制那些证据基础远远超出传统证据和分析范围和实践的概括。这是一本值得重温和讨论的书。鲍德温大量的二次参考资料慷慨地为他在这本非凡的书中开始的讨论提供了材料。
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Command and persuade: crime, law, and the state across history P. Baldwin, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press. 2021. 480pp. $34.95 (hbk); $24.95 (pbk) ISBN: 9780262045629; 9780262546027

Forty years ago, when Daniel Boorstin (1983) published his now classic volume of popular history, The discoverers, a sceptical reviewer in Time magazine said that the book read like the work of a man whose suitcase full of looseleaf notes had burst open while he was running to catch a bus. A not dissimilar feeling sometimes came over me while reading Peter Baldwin's extraordinarily ambitious new survey of crime, law, punishment and policing across recorded human history. There is much here both to enjoy and admire, not least the astonishing scale and range of the secondary referencing: nearly 1,800 notes covering the last 78 pages of the book. Baldwin has certainly consulted a lot of scholarship.

The broad assertions of this book will not strike any reasonably well-informed historian of criminal justice as overly surprising. Over several millennia, Baldwin tells us, sin and crime – once seen as essentially indistinguishable – have come to be defined, far more rigorously, as distinctive categories of human behaviour. Much of the reason for this involves the advent of state power. Where once human beings relied upon divine intervention for the enforcement of moral and social norms, increasingly that task has fallen to the state. Early regimes, which were authoritarian in character, relied upon occasional examples of extreme penal severity – breaking on the wheel, decapitation, hangings on a sometimes enormous scale, and so forth – to deter potential wrongdoers. As states grew more democratic and humane, so too did the formal character of their penal sanctions. The advent of non-lethal punishments, notably banishment, fines, and finally large-scale imprisonment, enabled the state to relinquish its early reliance upon execution and other modes of bodily torment. Indeed, since the early 19th century, professionalised policing – now critically abetted by the extraordinary surveillance capacities afforded by modern technologies, and by the substantial abandonment of paper currency and coin – has enabled states to pursue more and more rigorous and effective means of preventing crimes from occurring in the first place. In many parts of the developed world, a person can go their whole life without being robbed or burgled.

If the general trend of all this sounds broadly and reassuringly humane, however, there is also an authoritarian paradox at work. Even as the capacity of modern societies to inspire wider and deeper adherence to social norms has taken hold, so too has the sheer volume of criminal offences as the compulsory capacities of the state have reached unprecedented levels. The US federal penal code, only eight pages long in 1875, now runs to almost 900 (p.22). About 40% of the new enactments were made in only a quarter century after 1970 (p.348), a dismal testimony to the cultural shocks of the 1960s and the prevailing sense – especially in America – that society was on the brink of collapse, a conviction sustained by the contemporary world's all-pervasive electronic media. Where once states, for lack of capacity, punished only a few crimes, more than 80% of criminals in the Western world are punished in some way or another (p.265). The more civilised human beings have become, the more comprehensively they appear to expect established authorities to regulate and repress infractions. Any brutalities that may ensue are generally tolerated because the vast majority of people are inherently law-abiding and seldom encounter the police in any context other than the occasional traffic infraction. The sharpest edges of state power are now felt by only that small proportion of the population that finds itself most comprehensively marginalised: socially, economically, often even geographically.

The scope of Baldwin's storytelling is remarkable, and he is a dab hand at supplying both vivid examples and striking generalisations. The professional historian in me, however, sometimes wondered about the finer details of explanation and analysis, particularly chronology and geographical variation. Baldwin often ranges freely back and forth, in the space of only one or two pages, among the ancient world, the medieval and early modern eras, and the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, as well as across any number of national and cultural boundaries. The breadth of the notetaking, and the ambition with which the notes are marshalled in supporting general assertions, is sometimes awesome. Causal connections, however, are often hard to discern, much less the ways in which specific developments must have varied from one time and place to another – and why they did so. Books like this are often admired for providing ‘comparative’ perspectives across time and space. Baldwin's style more often seems cumulative rather than genuinely comparative in character. Not everyone will find such an approach problematic. The proverbial ‘intelligent but uninformed reader’ will encounter a wide range of interesting and suggestive information.

It is only in the last chapter that Baldwin lays his analytical cards on the table. Classical historical and sociological perspectives, most notably Norbert Elias's (2000) ‘civilizing process’, date the evolution of social behaviour and state regulation alike from only the later Middle Ages, while Michel Foucault concentrates on the ‘Enlightenment’ and its contradictions during the years since the mid-18th century. Baldwin's temporal and geographical ambit is vastly larger. For him, the processes of socialisation – the central glue of modern societies – began as soon as hunter-gatherers started to form stable and sedentary communities. The state per se was a latecomer to all of this. This is a striking and suggestive conceptual framework, though conventionally trained historians may join the present reviewer in instinctively resisting generalisations whose evidentiary bases lie far beyond the conventional scope and practices of evidence and analysis. This is a book to revisit and with which to argue. Baldwin's vast secondary referencing generously provides the material with which to sustain the discussion he has begun in this remarkable book.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
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发文量
41
期刊介绍: The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice is an international peer-reviewed journal committed to publishing high quality theory, research and debate on all aspects of the relationship between crime and justice across the globe. It is a leading forum for conversation between academic theory and research and the cultures, policies and practices of the range of institutions concerned with harm, security and justice.
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