为外推的推论解释辩护

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-04-03 DOI:10.1080/02698595.2021.2015678
T. Baetu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要根据假设生成器的说法,从来源到目标系统的有效外推是循环的,因为它们依赖于只有通过调查目标才能获得的相关相似性和差异性知识,从而消除了外推的必要性;因此,推断推理只能作为一种产生假设的方法。我拒绝这种观点,支持推理解释,专注于支撑实验结果聚合的推断,并探索了两条论证线,以支持这些推断可以以非圆形方式验证的结论。第一个论点依赖于推理有效性的形式证明,证明有可能根据因果结构的先验知识进行推理,以确定一个主张是否可以外推。第二个论点建立在这样一个事实之上,即假设生成器的账户忽略了关键的推理和实验实践,从而导致了越来越明智的推断。
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In Defence of an Inferential Account of Extrapolation
ABSTRACT According to the hypothesis-generator account, valid extrapolations from a source to a target system are circular, since they rely on knowledge of relevant similarities and differences that can only be obtained by investigating the target, thus removing the need to extrapolate; hence, extrapolative reasoning can only be useful as a method for generating hypotheses. I reject this view in favour of an inferential account, focused on extrapolations underpinning the aggregation of experimental results, and explore two lines of argumentation supporting the conclusion that these extrapolations can be validated in a noncircular manner. The first argument relies on formal proofs of inferential validity demonstrating that it is possible to reason from prior knowledge of causal structures in order to determine whether a claim can be extrapolated. The second argument builds on the fact that the hypothesis-generator account overlooks key inferential and experimental practices resulting in progressively better-informed extrapolations.
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来源期刊
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-
自引率
12.50%
发文量
10
期刊介绍: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science is a scholarly journal dedicated to publishing original research in philosophy of science and in philosophically informed history and sociology of science. Its scope includes the foundations and methodology of the natural, social, and human sciences, philosophical implications of particular scientific theories, and broader philosophical reflection on science. The editors invite contributions not only from philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, but also from researchers in the sciences. The journal publishes articles from a wide variety of countries and philosophical traditions.
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