{"title":"董事会的被动","authors":"C. Yung","doi":"10.1093/rcfs/cfac012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n A CEO proposes a strategic plan to a board of directors acting in an advisory role. Each director supports the plan, opposes it, or delays speaking until other directors act. The option to delay suppresses dissent from bad plans in equilibrium. Delay has a pronounced impact for important decisions and for firms with reputable CEOs who make few errors. I investigate the role of ordering, that is, when directors should be invited to speak as a function of their signal precision.","PeriodicalId":44656,"journal":{"name":"Review of Corporate Finance Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Passivity on the Board of Directors\",\"authors\":\"C. Yung\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/rcfs/cfac012\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n A CEO proposes a strategic plan to a board of directors acting in an advisory role. Each director supports the plan, opposes it, or delays speaking until other directors act. The option to delay suppresses dissent from bad plans in equilibrium. Delay has a pronounced impact for important decisions and for firms with reputable CEOs who make few errors. I investigate the role of ordering, that is, when directors should be invited to speak as a function of their signal precision.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44656,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Corporate Finance Studies\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-03-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Corporate Finance Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfac012\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Corporate Finance Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfac012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
A CEO proposes a strategic plan to a board of directors acting in an advisory role. Each director supports the plan, opposes it, or delays speaking until other directors act. The option to delay suppresses dissent from bad plans in equilibrium. Delay has a pronounced impact for important decisions and for firms with reputable CEOs who make few errors. I investigate the role of ordering, that is, when directors should be invited to speak as a function of their signal precision.
期刊介绍：
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS) is dedicated to publishing high-quality research in the expansive field of Corporate Finance. The journal seeks original contributions, reviewing papers based on their unique insights into Corporate Finance. This encompasses a wide spectrum, including a firm's interactions with stakeholders, capital markets, internal organization structure, compensation mechanisms, corporate governance, and capital management. RCFS also welcomes research in financial intermediation, financial institutions, microstructure, and the implications of asset pricing for Corporate Finance. The journal considers theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers for review.
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