多长才算够长?

Q4 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Journal of Retirement Pub Date : 2020-09-23 DOI:10.3905/JOR.2020.1.072
G. Buetow, Bernd Hanke
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引用次数: 0

摘要

固定缴款计划(DCP)受托人在履行职责和终止表现不佳的主动管理人员时,往往面临着相互冲突的观点。顾问、投资经理和资本市场中介机构通常认为,需要更多的时间来证明一种投资策略是次优的。这些各方经常有内在的利益冲突,争论主动管理而不是被动管理。大多数冲突本质上都是经济上的,但也有一些是智力上的傲慢。在本文中,作者从计划参与者(PP)的角度进入争论。最终,DCP的本质是提供一个投资选择菜单,使pp能够使用多资产类别解决方案以多样化的方式优化财富聚集。我们表明,当受托人监控主动投资经理,并在他们表现不佳时及时用被动替代方案取代他们时,私人客户得到了更好的服务。计划受托人经常通过用其他主动基金取代表现不佳的主动基金来搅乱DCP。主题:基金经理选择、共同基金业绩、被动式策略、退休、财富管理主要发现•当受托人监督主动式投资经理,并在其表现不佳时及时将其替换为被动式投资经理时,固定缴款计划的参与者将得到更好的服务。•一个为期三年的滚动回报窗口,将主动型基金的回报与基准回报进行比较,似乎为主动转被动决策提供了最佳决策标准。•拥有结构良好、离散决策框架的受托人为计划参与者提供更好的服务,以取代表现不佳的主动基金。
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How Long Is Long Enough?
Defined-contribution plan (DCP) fiduciaries are often faced with conflicting perspectives when executing their responsibilities and terminating underperforming active managers are involved. Consultants, investment managers, and capital market intermediaries generally argue that more time is needed to prove that an investment strategy is suboptimal. These parties often have inherent conflicts of interest to argue for active management over passive management. Most conflicts are economic in nature, but some are steeped in intellectual hubris. In this article, the authors enter the fray from the plan participant (PP) side. Ultimately, the very essence of a DCP is to offer a menu of investment options that enable PPs to optimize wealth aggregation in a diversified manner using a multiasset class solution. We show that PPs are better served when fiduciaries monitor active investment managers and replace them with passive alternatives in a timely manner if they underperform. Too often plan fiduciaries churn a DCP by replacing underperforming active funds with other active funds. TOPICS: Manager selection, mutual fund performance, passive strategies, retirement, wealth management Key Findings • Defined-contribution plan participants are better served when fiduciaries monitor active investment managers and replace them with passive alternatives in a timely manner if they underperform. • A three-year rolling return window to compare active fund returns with benchmark returns seems to provide the best decision criterion for the active-to-passive decision. • Plan participants are far better served by fiduciaries who have a well-structured, discrete decision framework for replacing underperforming active funds.
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来源期刊
Journal of Retirement
Journal of Retirement Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Finance
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊最新文献
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