法院拥挤与民主衰退:必然的关系?

IF 0.8 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Global Constitutionalism Pub Date : 2023-02-27 DOI:10.1017/s2045381723000011
Benjamin Garcia Holgado, Raúl Sánchez Urribarrí
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引用次数: 1

摘要

越来越多关于法院在民主倒退中的作用的文献声称,法院包装削弱了自由民主。然而,事实并非如此。制造法庭包装的行为者的目标有助于解释为什么司法机构的合作在某些(尽管不是全部)案件中会对自由民主产生实质性的负面影响。在这方面,我们区分两种类型的法院包装。首先,当政治家操纵法院的组成以确保政策的快速实施时,政策驱动的法院包装就会发生。虽然这往往会对司法独立产生负面影响,但它本身并不是迈向政权更迭的第一步。其次,当政客们以侵蚀民主为目标改变法院的组成时,政权驱动的法院填塞就会发生。在这种情况下,法院包装对司法独立的负面影响对自由民主的不同维度产生了系统性的负面影响。依靠广泛的第一手和第二手资料,我们通过比较两个案例,对这两种类型的法院包装进行了概念化:阿根廷的卡洛斯·梅内姆(Carlos Menem, 1989-99年)寻求司法支持,以实施亲市场的经济改革;委内瑞拉的雨果Chávez(1999-2013年)和Nicolás马杜罗(2013年至今),在民主倒退的背景下寻求控制司法。
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Court-packing and democratic decay: A necessary relationship?
A growing body of literature on the role of courts in democratic backsliding claims that court-packing weakens liberal democracy. However, this is not necessarily the case. The goals of the actors who produce court-packing help to explain why the co-optation of the judiciary can have a substantial negative effect on liberal democracy in some (although not all) cases. In this respect, we distinguish two types of court-packing. First, policy-driven court-packing occurs when politicians manipulate the composition of courts in order to assure a quick implementation of policies. Although this tends to negatively affect judicial independence, it is not per se a first step towards regime change. Second, regime-driven court-packing happens when politicians alter the composition of the courts with the goal of eroding democracy. In this case, court-packing’s negative effect on judicial independence has a systemic negative effect on different dimensions of liberal democracy. Relying on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, we conceptualize these two types of court-packing by comparing two cases: Carlos Menem (1989–99) in Argentina, seeking judicial support to carry out pro-market economic reforms, and Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013–present) in Venezuela, seeking to control the judiciary in the context of democratic backsliding.
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来源期刊
Global Constitutionalism
Global Constitutionalism Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
28
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