{"title":"德国国家宪法法院","authors":"Werner Reutter","doi":"10.3167/gps.2021.390201","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The article shows that two constitutional principles govern the election of justices and the composition of the 16 German state constitutional courts: democracy and the separation of powers. The recruitment of candidates, the vote on nominees in state parliaments, and the composition of benches of the courts in question support this assumption. There is no evidence indicating that a partisan takeover of German state constitutional courts has taken place. In addition, the majorities required for an appointment of justices of state constitutional courts seem less crucial than is often assumed.","PeriodicalId":44521,"journal":{"name":"GERMAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"German State Constitutional Courts\",\"authors\":\"Werner Reutter\",\"doi\":\"10.3167/gps.2021.390201\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The article shows that two constitutional principles govern the election of justices and the composition of the 16 German state constitutional courts: democracy and the separation of powers. The recruitment of candidates, the vote on nominees in state parliaments, and the composition of benches of the courts in question support this assumption. There is no evidence indicating that a partisan takeover of German state constitutional courts has taken place. In addition, the majorities required for an appointment of justices of state constitutional courts seem less crucial than is often assumed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44521,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"GERMAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"GERMAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3167/gps.2021.390201\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"AREA STUDIES\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"GERMAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3167/gps.2021.390201","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
The article shows that two constitutional principles govern the election of justices and the composition of the 16 German state constitutional courts: democracy and the separation of powers. The recruitment of candidates, the vote on nominees in state parliaments, and the composition of benches of the courts in question support this assumption. There is no evidence indicating that a partisan takeover of German state constitutional courts has taken place. In addition, the majorities required for an appointment of justices of state constitutional courts seem less crucial than is often assumed.