国家援助与污染者自付原则的一致性:旨在减缓气候变化的援助

Pub Date : 2020-03-19 DOI:10.1163/18786561-01001002
N. Sadeleer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

自2009年以来,欧盟ets指令制定了排放配额拍卖的一般规则。它受到一些豁免。电力部门免费津贴的过渡性分配,以及一般情况下免费或低于市场价格的津贴的发放,都受到欧盟禁止发放国家援助的约束。然而,欧盟立法机构及其执行机构——欧盟委员会——有权给予欧盟成员国豁免,以纠正市场失灵。从表面上看,这种安排似乎违背了污染者付费原则,因为国家援助补贴温室气体排放,而不是将其成本内化为接受设施提供的商品和服务的价格。本文探讨了这种安排如何构成国家援助,并分析了豁免符合污染者付费原则的方式。
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Consistency between the Granting of State Aid and the Polluter-Pays Principle: Aid Aimed at Mitigating Climate Change
Since 2009, the EU ets Directive set up a general rule for the auctioning of emission allowances. It is subject to a number of exemptions. The transitional allocation of free allowances in the electricity sector, and in general the granting of free or below-market-price allowances, are caught by the tfeu prohibition on grants of state aid. However, the EU legislature and its executive—the European Commission—are empowered to grant the EU member states exemptions in order to correct market failures. At face value, such arrangements seem to run contrary to the polluter-pays principle on account that state aid subsidizes emissions of greenhouse gases instead of internalizing their costs into the price of goods and services delivered by the recipient installations. This article explores how such arrangements amount to state aid and analyses the manner in which the exemptions are consistent with the polluter-pays principle.
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