{"title":"只为惩罚而进行的有针对性的杀戮实际上是不可能的:克里斯蒂安·布劳恩的复辩","authors":"A. Le","doi":"10.1080/15027570.2021.1989840","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article critically engages with Christian Braun's article “The Morality of Retributive Targeted Killing” from the Journal of Military Ethics. Braun argues that retributive targeted killing can be justified within a Thomistic framework of Just War Theory. Importantly, however, this must be tempered by the virtue of charity and cannot result in any collateral damage. I argue that while punishment-as-retributivism is possible in theory, in practice, we cannot rule out the deterrent aspect and, thus, any retributivist justification is also necessarily deterrent in nature. Furthermore, following Braun's embrace of the virtue of charity, assuming that we know with certainty that a suspect would not pose any future threats, we ought not to proceed with the targeted killing. This means that the justification of retributive targeted killing is justified by its deterrent nature.","PeriodicalId":39180,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Military Ethics","volume":"20 1","pages":"145 - 151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Targeted Killing for Retribution Only Is Practically Impossible: A Rejoinder to Christian Braun\",\"authors\":\"A. Le\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/15027570.2021.1989840\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT This article critically engages with Christian Braun's article “The Morality of Retributive Targeted Killing” from the Journal of Military Ethics. Braun argues that retributive targeted killing can be justified within a Thomistic framework of Just War Theory. Importantly, however, this must be tempered by the virtue of charity and cannot result in any collateral damage. I argue that while punishment-as-retributivism is possible in theory, in practice, we cannot rule out the deterrent aspect and, thus, any retributivist justification is also necessarily deterrent in nature. Furthermore, following Braun's embrace of the virtue of charity, assuming that we know with certainty that a suspect would not pose any future threats, we ought not to proceed with the targeted killing. This means that the justification of retributive targeted killing is justified by its deterrent nature.\",\"PeriodicalId\":39180,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Military Ethics\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"145 - 151\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-04-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Military Ethics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2021.1989840\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Military Ethics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2021.1989840","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
Targeted Killing for Retribution Only Is Practically Impossible: A Rejoinder to Christian Braun
ABSTRACT This article critically engages with Christian Braun's article “The Morality of Retributive Targeted Killing” from the Journal of Military Ethics. Braun argues that retributive targeted killing can be justified within a Thomistic framework of Just War Theory. Importantly, however, this must be tempered by the virtue of charity and cannot result in any collateral damage. I argue that while punishment-as-retributivism is possible in theory, in practice, we cannot rule out the deterrent aspect and, thus, any retributivist justification is also necessarily deterrent in nature. Furthermore, following Braun's embrace of the virtue of charity, assuming that we know with certainty that a suspect would not pose any future threats, we ought not to proceed with the targeted killing. This means that the justification of retributive targeted killing is justified by its deterrent nature.