{"title":"Ⅶ——斯宾诺莎的《静止不动》","authors":"Alexander X. Douglas","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n For Spinoza, the highest thing we can hope for is acquiescentia in se ipso—acquiescence in oneself. As an ethical ideal, this might appear as a complacent quietism, a licence to accept the way you are and give up hope of improving either yourself or the world. I argue that the opposite is the case. Self-acquiescence in Spinoza’s sense is a very challenging goal: it requires a form of self-understanding that is extremely difficult to attain. It also involves occupying a daring and radical political position, one that obstructs the psychological mechanisms by which political power is typically maintained.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"VII—Spinoza’s Unquiet Acquiescentia\",\"authors\":\"Alexander X. Douglas\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n For Spinoza, the highest thing we can hope for is acquiescentia in se ipso—acquiescence in oneself. As an ethical ideal, this might appear as a complacent quietism, a licence to accept the way you are and give up hope of improving either yourself or the world. I argue that the opposite is the case. Self-acquiescence in Spinoza’s sense is a very challenging goal: it requires a form of self-understanding that is extremely difficult to attain. It also involves occupying a daring and radical political position, one that obstructs the psychological mechanisms by which political power is typically maintained.\",\"PeriodicalId\":35222,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-05-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
For Spinoza, the highest thing we can hope for is acquiescentia in se ipso—acquiescence in oneself. As an ethical ideal, this might appear as a complacent quietism, a licence to accept the way you are and give up hope of improving either yourself or the world. I argue that the opposite is the case. Self-acquiescence in Spinoza’s sense is a very challenging goal: it requires a form of self-understanding that is extremely difficult to attain. It also involves occupying a daring and radical political position, one that obstructs the psychological mechanisms by which political power is typically maintained.
期刊介绍:
The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society contains the papers read at the Society"s fortnightly meetings in London throughout the academic year, and short discussion notes on these papers. Papers are drawn from an international base of contributors and discuss issues across a broad range of philosophical traditions, including those which are of greatest current interest.