解决自身疾病的模糊性:构建重发现的案例

IF 0.9 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-03-17 DOI:10.1080/13869795.2022.2051589
Sofia M. I. Jeppsson
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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要精神病患者有时会问,他们是谁——他们自己——和他们的精神疾病之间的界限在哪里。这个问题在文献中被称为自病歧义;有人认为,解决上述歧义是精神病治疗的关键部分。我将现实主义解决方案与建构主义解决方案区分开来。前者需要在精神病患者的精神生活中,在属于自我的和属于精神疾病的之间找到一个所谓的预先存在的边界。我认为,不存在这样的边界,试图找到它甚至可能使人们感觉到的模糊性变得更糟。相反,任何解决方案都必须是建构主义的;患者(和其他人)应该仔细考虑并讨论该认同或不认同什么。我进一步认为,精神病患者不必将自己的精神疾病视为与自己完全不同,以避免以有问题的方式“认同自己的诊断”。最后,我们可以为精神病患者的问题行为开脱——事实上,我们可以用一种更微妙、更具建设性的方式来开脱——同时拒绝接受精神疾病与患者自身完全不同的观点。
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Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery
ABSTRACT Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are – their selves – and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that which belongs to the mental illness. I argue that no such border exists, and that attempts to find it might even render the felt ambiguity worse. Instead, any solution must be constructivist; the patient (and others) should deliberate and discuss what to identify with or not. I further argue that psychiatric patients need not see their mental illness as wholly distinct from themselves to avoid ‘identifying with their diagnoses' in a problematic way. Finally, we can excuse problematic behaviour by mentally ill people – in fact, we can do so in a more nuanced and constructive way – while rejecting the view that the mental illness is wholly distinct from the patient’s self.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
16.70%
发文量
29
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