主权优先购买国地位

IF 2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Northwestern University Law Review Pub Date : 2017-01-26 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2906614
J. Nash
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引用次数: 1

摘要

一个州什么时候有资格挑战行政部门对联邦法律执行不力的指控?这个问题在奥巴马执政期间变得非常重要,“红州”在移民和医疗保健等众多问题上起诉行政部门。在特朗普执政期间,立场问题似乎仍然至关重要,只是行动者的政治取向发生了逆转。本文主张主权优先地位,即当(i)联邦政府优先于州法律,而(ii)行政部门据称没有执行国会为填补由优先地位引起的监管空白而颁布的联邦法律时,一个州将享有第三条起诉联邦政府的地位。国家主权优先地位自然产生于联邦制度中各州的职能。它的基础是对父母的伤害——也就是说,对国家保护其公民免受伤害的能力的伤害。联邦政府可以适当地优先于州法律,其逻辑是,联邦政府据此认为州政府有义务保护本州公民免受伤害。当行政部门未能充分执行联邦法律时,就会使该州的公民得不到保护。这样,该州就有了代表其公民起诉联邦政府的第三条权利。国家主权优先地位运作的案例范围并不大,这应该减轻对打开州-联邦诉讼闸门的担忧。此外,审慎原则可以被覆盖,以便筛选出更多的案例。或者,主权优先国家地位也可以更广泛地解释,以便它不仅适用于行政部门执法不足的情况,而且适用于一般的横向联邦分歧的情况-即,也适用于行政部门执法过度的情况。
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Sovereign Preemption State Standing
When does a state have standing to challenge the executive branch’s alleged under-enforcement of federal law? The issue took on importance during the Obama administration, with “red states” suing the executive branch over numerous issues, including immigration and health care. The question of standing looks to remain critical during the Trump administration, only with the political orientation of the actors reversed. This Article argues in favor of sovereign preemption standing, under which a state would enjoy Article III standing to sue the federal government when (i) the federal government preempts state law, yet (ii) the executive branch allegedly under-enforces the federal law that Congress enacted to fill the regulatory gap to which the preemption gave rise. Sovereign preemption state standing arises naturally out of the function of states in the federal system. It is grounded upon parens patriae injury — that is, injury to the state’s ability to protect its citizens against harm. The federal government can properly preempt state law, on the logic that it then assumes from the state the obligation to protect the state’s citizens from harm. Where the executive branch then fails adequately to enforce federal law, it leaves the state’s citizens unprotected. The state then has Article III standing to sue the federal government on behalf of its citizenry.The universe of cases where sovereign preemption state standing operates is not large, which should assuage concerns over opening the floodgates of state-federal litigation. Moreover, prudential doctrines can be overlaid such that more cases would be screened out. Alternatively, sovereign preemption state standing also can be construed somewhat more broadly so that it applies not only to the setting of executive branch under-enforcement, but to the setting of horizontal federal disagreement in general — i.e., to the setting of executive branch over-enforcement as well.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
10.50%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Northwestern University Law Review is a student-operated journal that publishes four issues of high-quality, general legal scholarship each year. Student editors make the editorial and organizational decisions and select articles submitted by professors, judges, and practitioners, as well as student pieces.
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