不论条款:立法机关、法院和选民

IF 0.7 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW University of Toronto Law Journal Pub Date : 2021-10-18 DOI:10.3138/utlj-2020-0135
R. Leckey, E. Mendelsohn
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要:本文对《加拿大权利与自由宪章》第33条中的“尽管条款”进行了解释。当立法机关激活“不管”条款时,第33(2)款通过防止其在至上条款的意义上与《加拿大宪法》“不一致”,从而暂时确保受保护法律的“运作”,从而排除诸如推翻等司法补救措施。根据其组成部分(其中一些从未被加拿大最高法院考虑过)和其他宪法特征来解释,尽管条款并不使权利无关紧要或剥夺其法律性质。它也没有将权利权衡的评估单独交给立法机关。取而代之的是,第33(3)款指明了此类评估的框架,在该框架中,投票公众起着至关重要的评估作用。法院作为《宪法》的解释者和守护者,能够而且在某些情况下应该通过宣布受保护的法律在多大程度上不合理地限制《宪章》权利来支持公众的宪法角色。公众在评估权利权衡时考虑这些声明的能力将促进第33(3)条的民主目的,这一目的更广泛地支撑着我们的宪法框架。
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The notwithstanding clause: Legislatures, courts, and the electorate
Abstract:This article interprets the notwithstanding clause in section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. When a legislature activates the notwithstanding clause, subsection 33(2) temporarily ensures a protected law's 'operation' by preventing it from being 'inconsistent' with the Constitution of Canada in the sense of the supremacy clause, thereby precluding judicial remedies such as striking down. Construed in the light of its components (some never considered by the Supreme Court of Canada) and other constitutional features, the notwithstanding clause does not make rights irrelevant or strip them of their legal character. Nor does it confide the assessment of trade-offs about rights to the legislature alone. Instead, subsection 33(3) indicates a framework for such assessments in which the voting public plays a crucial evaluative role. The courts, as interpreters and guardians of the Constitution, can, and in some circumstances should, support the public's constitutional role by declaring the extent to which a protected law unjustifiably limits Charter rights. The public's ability to take such declarations into account in evaluating rights trade-offs would advance the democratic purpose of subsection 33(3), a purpose that underpins our constitutional framework more broadly.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
16.70%
发文量
26
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