审计需求和监督机制:来自美国证券交易委员会评论信和卖空者的证据

IF 2.8 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Managerial Auditing Journal Pub Date : 2022-05-31 DOI:10.1108/maj-09-2020-2836
Justyna Skomra, Pervaiz Alam, Piotr Antoni Skomra
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引用次数: 2

摘要

目的探讨美国证券交易委员会(SEC)和卖空者两种监督机制对管理层审计质量要求的影响。设计/方法/方法利用2005年至2015年间美国证券交易委员会CL的空头头寸信息和面板数据,本研究应用logit回归模型来估计聘请四大和行业专家审计公司的可能性。本研究还应用了一种普通的最小二乘回归技术来估计审计费用。调查结果与披露和代理理论一致,实证分析结果表明,管理层要求更高质量的审计,以更高的审计费用衡量,并更可能聘请四大和行业专家审计公司。然而,这项研究发现,效果因具体的监测机制而异。此外,当这两种监测机制都到位时,当审计需求被聘请四大/行业专家审计公司的倾向所捕获时,SEC CL会推动审计质量需求的总体方向。研究局限性/含义本研究使研究人员更好地了解了影响审计质量需求方的因素。此外,它还增加了关于SEC CL和卖空的经济后果的文献流。原创性/价值据作者所知,这是第一项全面的研究,记录了SEC CL和卖空两种类型的监督机制对审计质量需求的影响。
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Audit demand and monitoring mechanisms: evidence from SEC comment letters and short sellers
Purpose The paper aims to explore the impact of two types of monitoring mechanisms, namely, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters (CLs) and short sellers, on management’s demand for audit quality. Design/methodology/approach Using information on the short interest positions and a panel data of SEC CLs between 2005 and 2015, this study applies logit regression model to estimate the likelihood of hiring Big 4 and industry expert audit firm. This study also applies an ordinary least squares regression technique to estimate audit fees. Findings Consistent with disclosure and agency theories, results from empirical analyses provide that management demands higher quality audits measured by higher audit fees, and higher likelihood to hire Big 4 and industry expert audit firm. However, this study finds that the effect varies depending on the specific monitoring mechanisms. Additionally, when both monitoring mechanisms are in place, the SEC CLs drive the overall direction of the demand for audit quality when audit demand is captured by propensity to hire Big 4/industry expert audit firm. Research limitations/implications This study provides researchers with enhanced understanding of the factors having effect on the demand side for audit quality. Furthermore, it adds to the stream of literature on economic consequences of SEC CLs and short selling. Originality/value To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study to document the effect of two types of monitoring mechanisms, namely, SEC CLs and short selling, on the demand for audit quality.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
13.80%
发文量
45
期刊介绍: The key areas addressed are: ■Audit and Assurance (financial and non-financial) ■Financial and Managerial Reporting ■Governance, controls, risks and ethics ■Organizational issues including firm cultures, performance and development In addition, the evaluation of changes occurring in the auditing profession, as well as the broader fields of accounting and assurance, are also explored. Debates concerning organizational performance and professional competence are also covered.
期刊最新文献
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