Should I Be Proud of Liberalism with Excellence? On the Collective Grounds of Self-Respect

In Liberalism with Excellence Kramer offers an account of liberalism that gets at something liberal philosophy often overlooks: the crucial importance for individuals of the success of their groups. 2 He argues that the idea can be made coherent with two positions that have been developed in opposition to one another. The first position is that of Rawlsian liberalism. According to this view, where constitutional essentials are concerned, the state’s action cannot be justified with reference to the fact that it may promote values, projects, activities or modes of living aimed at the pursuit and achievement of the good life. In other words, justifications for state activity that concerns constitutional essentials should be confined to the advancement and honouring of justice. According to perfectionism, by contrast, the state can deliberately promote values, projects, activities and modes of living aimed at the good life; it can promote conceptions of the good. Kramer is a perfectionist. He argues that the state should invest in the success of the groups to which its citizens belong and that it can do so by promoting excellence in human achievements. This bolsters a variety of conceptions of the good, including those that value specific forms of such excellence. But Kramer argues that this is compatible with the Rawlsian liberal project. How? Because the excellence of one’s society or the achievements of outstanding individuals in one’s society bolsters the warranted self-respect of those who belong to the society. And, as Rawls sets it out, justice requires that individuals have a warranted sense of self-respect.