{"title":"跟随追随者:当经理人跟随分析师报道时的共同基金表现","authors":"Gerald Abdesaken","doi":"10.3905/jii.2018.9.1.036","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Mutual fund managers who adjust portfolio holdings based on analyst coverage and consensus recommendations achieve signi?cantly lower risk-adjusted returns, but perform better than when consensus recommendations are considered alone. In a rational expectations equilibrium setup, an unskilled investor places greater weight on a risky asset’s public signal, given an increase in the asset’s analyst coverage. A new measure of managerial skill based on analyst coverage is formulated and shown to be decreasing in mutual fund alphas.","PeriodicalId":36431,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Index Investing","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3905/jii.2018.9.1.036","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Following the Followers: Mutual Fund Performance When Managers Follow Analyst Coverage\",\"authors\":\"Gerald Abdesaken\",\"doi\":\"10.3905/jii.2018.9.1.036\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Mutual fund managers who adjust portfolio holdings based on analyst coverage and consensus recommendations achieve signi?cantly lower risk-adjusted returns, but perform better than when consensus recommendations are considered alone. In a rational expectations equilibrium setup, an unskilled investor places greater weight on a risky asset’s public signal, given an increase in the asset’s analyst coverage. A new measure of managerial skill based on analyst coverage is formulated and shown to be decreasing in mutual fund alphas.\",\"PeriodicalId\":36431,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Index Investing\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-05-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3905/jii.2018.9.1.036\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Index Investing\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3905/jii.2018.9.1.036\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"Economics, Econometrics and Finance\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Index Investing","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3905/jii.2018.9.1.036","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","Score":null,"Total":0}
Following the Followers: Mutual Fund Performance When Managers Follow Analyst Coverage
Mutual fund managers who adjust portfolio holdings based on analyst coverage and consensus recommendations achieve signi?cantly lower risk-adjusted returns, but perform better than when consensus recommendations are considered alone. In a rational expectations equilibrium setup, an unskilled investor places greater weight on a risky asset’s public signal, given an increase in the asset’s analyst coverage. A new measure of managerial skill based on analyst coverage is formulated and shown to be decreasing in mutual fund alphas.