管理能力与股价暴跌风险——管理者过度自信的作用

IF 3.6 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Review of Accounting and Finance Pub Date : 2021-08-21 DOI:10.1108/raf-05-2020-0111
Jiaxin Liu, Dongliang Lei
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引用次数: 3

摘要

目的研究在管理层过度自信的条件下,管理层能力与股价崩盘风险之间的关系。此外,在管理层过度自信的条件下,研究了管理层能力对企业选择坏消息囤积渠道的影响,从而导致股价暴跌。设计/方法/方法采用1994年至2018年在Compustat和CRSP上市的24289家公司的样本,作者进行了面板回归分析。研究发现:只有当管理者过度自信时,管理者能力才与股价崩盘风险呈正相关。此外,作者发现,管理能力似乎加剧(减弱)了过度自信的管理者使用盈余指导(盈余管理)渠道所隐瞒的坏消息。作者发现有限的证据表明,当管理者过度自信时,高能力的管理者可能会通过过度投资渠道和“其他渠道”隐瞒坏消息。最后,笔者发现,当企业内部控制存在重大缺陷、投资者信念异质性较高、信息不对称程度较高时,管理者过度自信和管理能力对企业崩溃风险的共同影响更为显著。然而,在最近的2008年金融危机期间,这种影响似乎消失了。原创性/价值本研究表明,当管理者过度自信时,管理能力对公司来说是昂贵的,会产生坏消息囤积和股价崩溃风险。这也揭示了管理者过度自信和管理能力如何影响管理者对坏消息隐瞒渠道的选择和股价暴跌风险。最后,本文对董事会选择未来高管具有一定的实用价值。
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Managerial ability and stock price crash risk – the role of managerial overconfidence
Purpose This paper aims to examine the relation between managerial ability and stock price crash risk, conditional on managerial overconfidence. In addition, conditional on managerial overconfidence, the authors investigate the effect of managerial ability on firms’ choice of bad news hoarding channels, which result in a stock price crash. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 24,289 firm-years from companies listed on Compustat and CRSP from 1994 to 2018, the authors conduct panel regression analysis. Findings The authors find that managerial ability is positively associated with stock price crash risk only when managerial overconfidence is high. Furthermore, the authors find that managerial ability seems to exacerbate (attenuate) the bad news withholding by the overconfident managers using the earnings guidance (earnings management) channel. The authors find limited evidence that high-ability managers are likely to withhold bad news through the overinvestment channel and “other channels” when managers are overconfident. Finally, the authors find that the joint effect of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability on firms’ crash risk is more pronounced when there is a material weakness in firms’ internal controls, high investor belief heterogeneity and high information asymmetry. However, this effect appears to dissipate during the recent financial crisis in 2008. Originality/value This research reveals that managerial ability is costly to firms by engendering bad news hoardings and stock price crash risk when managers are overconfident. It also sheds light on how managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect managers’ choice of bad news withholding channels and stock price crash risk. Finally, the paper is of practical value to the board of directors in selecting the prospective executives.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
18
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