主体性的地位

Christoph Halbig
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引用次数: 1

摘要

现代关于审慎价值理论的争论主要围绕着如何适应主体性的作用这一问题展开:审慎美好的生活(不像道德上美好的生活)似乎必然是对生活在其中的人有益的生活。本文旨在阐明主体性在审慎价值本体论中的这一关键作用。它试图表明,审慎价值理论中的强烈现实主义可以充分而令人满意地解释这一角色,这是正确理解的。有人认为,被证明与这样一个现实主义框架不兼容的主观主义直觉可以在独立的基础上被令人信服地拒绝。
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The Place of Subjectivity
The modern debate on the theory of prudential values is largely structured around the issue of how to accommodate the role of subjectivity: a prudentially good life (unlike, say, a morally good life) seems to be necessarily a life that is good for the person living it. The present article aims at clarifying this crucial role of subjectivity in the ontology of prudential values. It tries to show that this role, rightly understood, can be fully and satisfactorily accounted for by a strong realism in the theory of prudential value. Subjectivist intuitions that prove incompatible with such a realist framework, it is argued, can be convincingly rejected on independent grounds.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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