{"title":"缓刑","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/02645505211020523a","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"1 (greater harm and higher culpability), the recommended starting point is 3 years’ custody following contested trial, with a range between 30 months and 4 years. Greater harm was not disputed but J.’s counsel took issue with higher culpability on the basis that he had not used either hammer or knife as a weapon in assaulting the victim. If the case should thus properly count as Category 2 (on the basis of lesser culpability), the starting point would be 18 months with a range between 12 and 36 months. Addressing first the judge’s efforts to correct himself as regards the victim losing consciousness, the Appeal Court found it ‘difficult to see why that made any difference, given that it was accepted that this was an offence of greater harm’. Moving on to culpability level, the Court observed that ‘irrespective of the issue about the use of a weapon or equivalent, there are a variety of other factors which point, inescapably, to this being a case of higher culpability’. In addition to J.’s dangerousness (see above), there were all the aggravating features highlighted in the Domestic Abuse Guideline (see above). J. had known that the children were in the house (he had been minding them inhis partner’s absence)andwere likely towitness hisprolongedassault, plus ‘the sheer number of injuries inflicted’. His victim was vulnerable and it was at the least arguable that this case involved the deliberate targeting of a vulnerable victim, notwithstanding being a spur of the moment attack, lacking premeditation. As regards the point sought to be made regarding weapon use, the issue could not simply turn on whether or not the perpetrator had a weapon in his hand which he used to strike the victim. The application of this aspect of the guidelines requires a more ‘holistic’ approach.Atdifferent times J. hadhadboth a hammerand a knife in his hand, clearly intended at least to threaten the victim while he assaulted her. He had also thrown a bottle of wine at her, showering her with broken glass, readily categorised as use of a weapon or equivalent. Further, he had hurled the victim against a table and then a cupboard. If he had struck her with a piece of wood, that would plainly have been the use of a weapon. ‘Throwing her against the same piece of wood is likely to cause the same type of injury.’ ‘It might properly be regarded as over-pedantic to say that that was not the use of at least the equivalent of a weapon.’ The judge had been fully entitled to conclude that this crime had featured use of a weapon or equivalent. In the Appeal Court’s conclusion, this prolonged episode of intimate partner violence had been so serious that the judge had also been entitled to go beyond the conventional upper Guideline limit of 4 years. Though a stern sentence, adopting a starting point of four and a half years, resulting in 3 years after credit for plea, had not been manifestly excessive.","PeriodicalId":45814,"journal":{"name":"PROBATION JOURNAL","volume":"68 1","pages":"377 - 383"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Suspension of Sentence\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/02645505211020523a\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"1 (greater harm and higher culpability), the recommended starting point is 3 years’ custody following contested trial, with a range between 30 months and 4 years. Greater harm was not disputed but J.’s counsel took issue with higher culpability on the basis that he had not used either hammer or knife as a weapon in assaulting the victim. If the case should thus properly count as Category 2 (on the basis of lesser culpability), the starting point would be 18 months with a range between 12 and 36 months. Addressing first the judge’s efforts to correct himself as regards the victim losing consciousness, the Appeal Court found it ‘difficult to see why that made any difference, given that it was accepted that this was an offence of greater harm’. Moving on to culpability level, the Court observed that ‘irrespective of the issue about the use of a weapon or equivalent, there are a variety of other factors which point, inescapably, to this being a case of higher culpability’. In addition to J.’s dangerousness (see above), there were all the aggravating features highlighted in the Domestic Abuse Guideline (see above). J. had known that the children were in the house (he had been minding them inhis partner’s absence)andwere likely towitness hisprolongedassault, plus ‘the sheer number of injuries inflicted’. His victim was vulnerable and it was at the least arguable that this case involved the deliberate targeting of a vulnerable victim, notwithstanding being a spur of the moment attack, lacking premeditation. As regards the point sought to be made regarding weapon use, the issue could not simply turn on whether or not the perpetrator had a weapon in his hand which he used to strike the victim. The application of this aspect of the guidelines requires a more ‘holistic’ approach.Atdifferent times J. hadhadboth a hammerand a knife in his hand, clearly intended at least to threaten the victim while he assaulted her. He had also thrown a bottle of wine at her, showering her with broken glass, readily categorised as use of a weapon or equivalent. Further, he had hurled the victim against a table and then a cupboard. If he had struck her with a piece of wood, that would plainly have been the use of a weapon. ‘Throwing her against the same piece of wood is likely to cause the same type of injury.’ ‘It might properly be regarded as over-pedantic to say that that was not the use of at least the equivalent of a weapon.’ The judge had been fully entitled to conclude that this crime had featured use of a weapon or equivalent. In the Appeal Court’s conclusion, this prolonged episode of intimate partner violence had been so serious that the judge had also been entitled to go beyond the conventional upper Guideline limit of 4 years. Though a stern sentence, adopting a starting point of four and a half years, resulting in 3 years after credit for plea, had not been manifestly excessive.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45814,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PROBATION JOURNAL\",\"volume\":\"68 1\",\"pages\":\"377 - 383\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PROBATION JOURNAL\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/02645505211020523a\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PROBATION JOURNAL","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/02645505211020523a","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
1 (greater harm and higher culpability), the recommended starting point is 3 years’ custody following contested trial, with a range between 30 months and 4 years. Greater harm was not disputed but J.’s counsel took issue with higher culpability on the basis that he had not used either hammer or knife as a weapon in assaulting the victim. If the case should thus properly count as Category 2 (on the basis of lesser culpability), the starting point would be 18 months with a range between 12 and 36 months. Addressing first the judge’s efforts to correct himself as regards the victim losing consciousness, the Appeal Court found it ‘difficult to see why that made any difference, given that it was accepted that this was an offence of greater harm’. Moving on to culpability level, the Court observed that ‘irrespective of the issue about the use of a weapon or equivalent, there are a variety of other factors which point, inescapably, to this being a case of higher culpability’. In addition to J.’s dangerousness (see above), there were all the aggravating features highlighted in the Domestic Abuse Guideline (see above). J. had known that the children were in the house (he had been minding them inhis partner’s absence)andwere likely towitness hisprolongedassault, plus ‘the sheer number of injuries inflicted’. His victim was vulnerable and it was at the least arguable that this case involved the deliberate targeting of a vulnerable victim, notwithstanding being a spur of the moment attack, lacking premeditation. As regards the point sought to be made regarding weapon use, the issue could not simply turn on whether or not the perpetrator had a weapon in his hand which he used to strike the victim. The application of this aspect of the guidelines requires a more ‘holistic’ approach.Atdifferent times J. hadhadboth a hammerand a knife in his hand, clearly intended at least to threaten the victim while he assaulted her. He had also thrown a bottle of wine at her, showering her with broken glass, readily categorised as use of a weapon or equivalent. Further, he had hurled the victim against a table and then a cupboard. If he had struck her with a piece of wood, that would plainly have been the use of a weapon. ‘Throwing her against the same piece of wood is likely to cause the same type of injury.’ ‘It might properly be regarded as over-pedantic to say that that was not the use of at least the equivalent of a weapon.’ The judge had been fully entitled to conclude that this crime had featured use of a weapon or equivalent. In the Appeal Court’s conclusion, this prolonged episode of intimate partner violence had been so serious that the judge had also been entitled to go beyond the conventional upper Guideline limit of 4 years. Though a stern sentence, adopting a starting point of four and a half years, resulting in 3 years after credit for plea, had not been manifestly excessive.