友谊和对坏信念的排斥

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-02-14 DOI:10.1017/S0031819123000025
J. Brennan
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引用次数: 1

摘要

许多人认为,如果他们的道德和政治信仰足够糟糕,我们就不应该和他们做朋友。例如,他们认为我们不应该和三k党成员或纳粹交朋友。然而,并不是所有道德和政治信仰上的错误都使人们失去了友谊。如果是这样的话,那么我们就应该在某个地方画一条线,表明当一个人的信仰糟糕到我们不应该和他们交朋友的时候。本文考虑了许多关于如何以及为什么划清界限的候选建议,包括信仰可能是极端的,不合理的,非人性化的,不合理的等等。然而,经过审查,每个候选提案都失败了。他们要么提供了错误的理由来拒绝别人做朋友,要么无法解释什么是“足够糟糕”的信念。有各种各样的论点支持以错误的信念为基础拒绝与人交朋友,但这些论点也无法解释什么是“足够糟糕”。因此,这篇论文得出的结论是,存在一个真正的难题:当一些人的信仰足够糟糕时,我们确实应该把他们从友谊中排除出去,但我们甚至没有一个粗略的标准来说明什么是足够糟糕的。
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Friendship and Blackballing for Bad Beliefs
Abstract Many people believe that we should not be friends with others if they have bad enough moral and political beliefs. For instance, they think that we should not befriend KKK members or Nazis. However, not all errors in moral and political belief disqualify people from friendship. If so, then there is some line to be drawn somewhere which indicates when a person's beliefs are bad enough that we should not befriend them. This paper considers many candidate proposals for how and why to draw the line, including that beliefs might be extreme, be held irrationally, dehumanize others, are unreasonable, and more. However, upon inspection, each candidate proposal fails. They either provide the wrong kind of reason to reject people as friends, or they fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’ beliefs. There are various arguments in favour of rejecting people from friendship on the basis of their bad beliefs, but these arguments also fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’. Thus, this paper concludes there is a genuine puzzle: we should indeed blackball some people from friendship when their beliefs are bad enough, but we do not have even a rough specification of what counts as bad enough.
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Philosophy is the journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, which was founded in 1925 to build bridges between specialist philosophers and a wider educated public. The journal continues to fulfil a dual role: it is one of the leading academic journals of philosophy, but it also serves the philosophical interests of specialists in other fields (law, language, literature and the arts, medicine, politics, religion, science, education, psychology, history) and those of the informed general reader. Contributors are required to avoid needless technicality of language and presentation. The institutional subscription includes two supplements.
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