{"title":"表征不可或缺性与本体论承诺","authors":"J. Heron","doi":"10.1002/tht3.449","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Much recent work in the philosophy of mathematics is guided by the view that Platonism’s prospects depend on mathematics' explanatory role in science. If mathematics plays an explanatory role, and in the right kind of way, this carries ontological commitment. Conversely, this thought goes, if mathematics merely plays a representational role then our world-oriented uses of mathematics fail to commit us to mathematical objects. Against this assumption, I argue that our representational practices prima facie carry ontological commitment.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.449","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Representational indispensability and ontological commitment\",\"authors\":\"J. Heron\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/tht3.449\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Much recent work in the philosophy of mathematics is guided by the view that Platonism’s prospects depend on mathematics' explanatory role in science. If mathematics plays an explanatory role, and in the right kind of way, this carries ontological commitment. Conversely, this thought goes, if mathematics merely plays a representational role then our world-oriented uses of mathematics fail to commit us to mathematical objects. Against this assumption, I argue that our representational practices prima facie carry ontological commitment.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44963,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.449\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.449\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.449","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
Representational indispensability and ontological commitment
Much recent work in the philosophy of mathematics is guided by the view that Platonism’s prospects depend on mathematics' explanatory role in science. If mathematics plays an explanatory role, and in the right kind of way, this carries ontological commitment. Conversely, this thought goes, if mathematics merely plays a representational role then our world-oriented uses of mathematics fail to commit us to mathematical objects. Against this assumption, I argue that our representational practices prima facie carry ontological commitment.
期刊介绍：
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy is dedicated to the publication of short (of less than 4500 words), original, philosophical papers in the following areas: Logic, Philosophy of Maths, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, and Value Theory. All published papers will be analytic in style. We intend that readers of Thought will be exposed to the most central and significant issues and positions in contemporary philosophy that fall under its remit. We will publish only papers that exemplify the highest standard of clarity. Thought aims to give a response to all authors within eight weeks of submission. Thought employs a triple-blind review system: the author''s identity is not revealed to the editors and referees, and the referee''s identity is not revealed to the author. Every submitted paper is appraised by the Subject Editor of the relevant subject area. Papers that pass to the editors are read by at least two experts in the relevant subject area.
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