{"title":"契约完备性对机会主义行为、多层次交易成本和关系终止意愿的影响:选择吸引力的调节作用","authors":"H. Yi, Minkyung Lee, Fortue Edem Amenuvor","doi":"10.1108/ejm-01-2022-0022","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nPurpose\nThis study which is positioned in the ambit of control research investigates the impact of ex ante contractual completeness on opportunistic behaviors and ex post transaction costs, while assessing how these affect relationship termination intention. This study aims to examine alternative attractiveness as a necessary moderator of the nexus between transaction cost and relationship termination intention.\n\n\nDesign/methodology/approach\nData gathered from 211 companies in South Korea that have installed and run outsourced vending machines are analyzed and used to validate the study’s theoretical and empirical contributions.\n\n\nFindings\nThe findings, which rely only on data from companies that outsource and those that run outsourced vending machines, show that contractual completeness negatively affects both active and passive opportunism. The study also discovers that active opportunism positively affects both bargaining costs and monitoring costs, whereas passive opportunism has a positive and direct effect on maladaptation costs but a negative effect on monitoring costs. It further finds that both bargaining and maladaptation costs have positive and direct effects on relationship termination intention, while monitoring costs have a negative effect on the same. Furthermore, it is observed that alternative attractiveness moderates the relationships between bargaining costs and relationship termination intention, as well as maladaptation costs and relationship termination intention.\n\n\nPractical implications\nThis study demonstrates that contractual completeness can serve as an important ex ante control mechanism, whereas the two types of opportunism can raise transaction costs. Furthermore, alternative attractiveness is identified as a driver of the impact of transaction costs on relationship termination intention.\n\n\nOriginality/value\nA key point of the departure of this study is that it examines the moderating role of alternative attractiveness in the relationship between transaction cost and relationship termination intention. The paper also advances the control literature by emphasizing the critical role that contractual completeness plays in reducing the occurrence of (both active and passive) opportunism in business relationships (especially companies that outsource).\n","PeriodicalId":48401,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Marketing","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Effects of contractual completeness on opportunistic behaviors, multilevel transaction costs and relationship termination intention: the moderating effect of alternative attractiveness\",\"authors\":\"H. Yi, Minkyung Lee, Fortue Edem Amenuvor\",\"doi\":\"10.1108/ejm-01-2022-0022\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nPurpose\\nThis study which is positioned in the ambit of control research investigates the impact of ex ante contractual completeness on opportunistic behaviors and ex post transaction costs, while assessing how these affect relationship termination intention. This study aims to examine alternative attractiveness as a necessary moderator of the nexus between transaction cost and relationship termination intention.\\n\\n\\nDesign/methodology/approach\\nData gathered from 211 companies in South Korea that have installed and run outsourced vending machines are analyzed and used to validate the study’s theoretical and empirical contributions.\\n\\n\\nFindings\\nThe findings, which rely only on data from companies that outsource and those that run outsourced vending machines, show that contractual completeness negatively affects both active and passive opportunism. The study also discovers that active opportunism positively affects both bargaining costs and monitoring costs, whereas passive opportunism has a positive and direct effect on maladaptation costs but a negative effect on monitoring costs. It further finds that both bargaining and maladaptation costs have positive and direct effects on relationship termination intention, while monitoring costs have a negative effect on the same. Furthermore, it is observed that alternative attractiveness moderates the relationships between bargaining costs and relationship termination intention, as well as maladaptation costs and relationship termination intention.\\n\\n\\nPractical implications\\nThis study demonstrates that contractual completeness can serve as an important ex ante control mechanism, whereas the two types of opportunism can raise transaction costs. Furthermore, alternative attractiveness is identified as a driver of the impact of transaction costs on relationship termination intention.\\n\\n\\nOriginality/value\\nA key point of the departure of this study is that it examines the moderating role of alternative attractiveness in the relationship between transaction cost and relationship termination intention. The paper also advances the control literature by emphasizing the critical role that contractual completeness plays in reducing the occurrence of (both active and passive) opportunism in business relationships (especially companies that outsource).\\n\",\"PeriodicalId\":48401,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Journal of Marketing\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Journal of Marketing\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1108/ejm-01-2022-0022\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Marketing","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/ejm-01-2022-0022","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Effects of contractual completeness on opportunistic behaviors, multilevel transaction costs and relationship termination intention: the moderating effect of alternative attractiveness
Purpose
This study which is positioned in the ambit of control research investigates the impact of ex ante contractual completeness on opportunistic behaviors and ex post transaction costs, while assessing how these affect relationship termination intention. This study aims to examine alternative attractiveness as a necessary moderator of the nexus between transaction cost and relationship termination intention.
Design/methodology/approach
Data gathered from 211 companies in South Korea that have installed and run outsourced vending machines are analyzed and used to validate the study’s theoretical and empirical contributions.
Findings
The findings, which rely only on data from companies that outsource and those that run outsourced vending machines, show that contractual completeness negatively affects both active and passive opportunism. The study also discovers that active opportunism positively affects both bargaining costs and monitoring costs, whereas passive opportunism has a positive and direct effect on maladaptation costs but a negative effect on monitoring costs. It further finds that both bargaining and maladaptation costs have positive and direct effects on relationship termination intention, while monitoring costs have a negative effect on the same. Furthermore, it is observed that alternative attractiveness moderates the relationships between bargaining costs and relationship termination intention, as well as maladaptation costs and relationship termination intention.
Practical implications
This study demonstrates that contractual completeness can serve as an important ex ante control mechanism, whereas the two types of opportunism can raise transaction costs. Furthermore, alternative attractiveness is identified as a driver of the impact of transaction costs on relationship termination intention.
Originality/value
A key point of the departure of this study is that it examines the moderating role of alternative attractiveness in the relationship between transaction cost and relationship termination intention. The paper also advances the control literature by emphasizing the critical role that contractual completeness plays in reducing the occurrence of (both active and passive) opportunism in business relationships (especially companies that outsource).
期刊介绍:
The EJM is receptive to all areas of research which are relevant to marketing academic research, some examples are: ■Sustainability and ethical issues in marketing ■Consumer behaviour ■Advertising and branding issues ■Sales management and personal selling ■Methodology and metatheory of marketing research ■International and export marketing ■Services marketing ■New product development and innovation ■Retailing and distribution ■Macromarketing and societal issues ■Pricing and economic decision making in marketing ■Marketing models