Tenure of office, political rotation and the prevention and control of the COVID-19 epidemic in China

Abstract In discussing government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, the leadership of local officials is an important dimension that has been studied less than other aspects. From the perspective of political incentives, this paper empirically investigates the effect of the personal characteristics of municipal leaders, mainly their tenure of office and political rotation, on the prevention and control of the COVID-19 epidemic at the city level. The results indicate a negative relationship between tenure of office and the diagnostic rate of COVID-19. The experience of having diverse political rotation has strong positive effects on the prevention and control of the COVID-19 epidemic, especially in places with higher infection risks and better health resources. Due to the division of labor and cooperation between the Communist Party of China and the government, municipal party secretaries and mayors play different roles in the prevention and control of the COVID-19 epidemic. The findings contribute to understanding the dynamic relationship among political incentives, bureaucratic behaviors and performance in the anti-epidemic process in general.