{"title":"Propertius 1.3中的认识论不公正","authors":"Nick Ollivère","doi":"10.1353/are.2022.0006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In Propertius 1.3 we hear Cynthia speak for the first time, in direct speech, accusing Propertius of infidelity. It is a striking moment in elegy, barely to be repeated. In this paper I want to explore what the framework of epistemic injustice, part of the field of epistemology, could mean for a reading of this dramatic encounter. As elaborated by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, the theory provides radical new insights into how we conceive of the relationship between knowers, how we acquire and share our knowledge, and the prejudices and assumptions behind these interactions.","PeriodicalId":44750,"journal":{"name":"ARETHUSA","volume":"55 1","pages":"121 - 148"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Epistemic Injustice in Propertius 1.3\",\"authors\":\"Nick Ollivère\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/are.2022.0006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract:In Propertius 1.3 we hear Cynthia speak for the first time, in direct speech, accusing Propertius of infidelity. It is a striking moment in elegy, barely to be repeated. In this paper I want to explore what the framework of epistemic injustice, part of the field of epistemology, could mean for a reading of this dramatic encounter. As elaborated by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, the theory provides radical new insights into how we conceive of the relationship between knowers, how we acquire and share our knowledge, and the prejudices and assumptions behind these interactions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44750,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ARETHUSA\",\"volume\":\"55 1\",\"pages\":\"121 - 148\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ARETHUSA\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/are.2022.0006\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"历史学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"CLASSICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ARETHUSA","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/are.2022.0006","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"CLASSICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:In Propertius 1.3 we hear Cynthia speak for the first time, in direct speech, accusing Propertius of infidelity. It is a striking moment in elegy, barely to be repeated. In this paper I want to explore what the framework of epistemic injustice, part of the field of epistemology, could mean for a reading of this dramatic encounter. As elaborated by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, the theory provides radical new insights into how we conceive of the relationship between knowers, how we acquire and share our knowledge, and the prejudices and assumptions behind these interactions.
期刊介绍：
Arethusa is known for publishing original literary and cultural studies of the ancient world and of the field of classics that combine contemporary theoretical perspectives with more traditional approaches to literary and material evidence. Interdisciplinary in nature, this distinguished journal often features special thematic issues.
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