Counterfactual History: Three Worries and Replies

This article aims to shed light on what lies at the heart of skepticism towards counterfactual, alternative, or what-if history. On its face, counterfactual history gives historians and philosophers good reason to worry. First, because counterfactual pasts leave no traces, historians lack an important source of empirical warrant. Second, because rewriting historical events might unpredictably change the past, inferences about what might have happened seem only weakly supported by generalizations about what actually did happen. Third, counterfactual narratives appear especially vulnerable to wishful thinking. Ultimately, through consideration of the epistemic values that regulate the construction of counterfactual narratives, I marshal arguments against these objections and defend the legitimacy of the project. Still, I hope to show that far from being a mere ‘parlor game’, counterfactual history raises deep and provocative questions about historians’ ability to know our past, only some of which I address here.