50年过去了:衍生品是“来自地狱的产品”吗?30起衍生品损失案例的历史透视

J. Seoane
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引用次数: 0

摘要

金融衍生品一直被污名化。毫无疑问,大多数负面新闻(如果不是全部的话)都来自于备受瞩目的公司因这些产品而损失大量资金的案例,即所谓的衍生品崩溃。这些产品的独特之处在于,与任何其他金融工具不同,一些批评者一直主张它们的消亡。本文旨在通过分析1987年至2017年非金融终端用户中金融衍生品造成的30笔最大损失,从历史的角度回答这种批评是否合理的问题。这项分析的结果并不支持这些指控中的大多数。数据显示了四种主要模式:(1)样本中的所有衍生产品都按预期表现,所有损失都是由于市场策略时机不对造成的。没有任何损失可归因于业务或法律原因。(2) 在绝大多数情况下,这些衍生品策略故意不被设计为真正的套期保值,而是被用来获得场外利率或非凡回报,而不会为用户带来前期成本(“投机性套期保值”)。(3) 考虑到他们的学术背景,大多数最终用户可能没有完全掌握最复杂策略背后的数学,但他们似乎理解策略的风险回报权衡,因为他们同意承担额外的市场风险,以在没有前期成本的情况下实现场外利率。此外,对衍生品有深入的了解并不能保证成功。在我们的样本中,一些对最大损失负责的高管具有数学或高级财务背景。(4) 大多数财务经理公然低估了发生极端市场事件的可能性。总的来说,这些损失发生在一段持续的市场趋势之后。因此,财务经理们认为,最近的市场趋势将在可预见的未来持续下去,并忽视了极端和意外市场波动的风险。
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50 Years On: Are Derivatives a “Product from Hell”? Historical Perspectives on 30 Cases of Derivatives Losses
Financial derivatives have been consistently stigmatized. Undoubtedly, most if not all of the negative press arises from high-profile cases of companies that lost significant amounts of money with these products—the so-called derivatives debacles. These products are unique in the sense that, unlike any other financial instrument, some critics have consistently argued for their demise. This article aims to answer the question of whether this criticism is justified from a historical perspective by analyzing the 30 largest losses caused by financial derivatives among non-financial end users from 1987 to 2017. The results of this analysis do not support most of these accusations. The data show four main patterns: (1) All the derivatives products in the sample performed as expected, and all the losses resulted from wrongly timed market strategies. No losses were attributable to operational or legal reasons. (2) In the overwhelming majority of cases, these derivatives strategies were deliberately not designed as bona fide hedges but instead were used to attain off-market rates or extraordinary returns at no upfront cost for the users (“speculative hedging”). (3) Given their academic background, most end users likely did not fully grasp the math behind the most complex strategies, but they seemed to understand the risk-return tradeoffs of their strategies because they agreed to assume additional market risks to achieve off-market rates with no upfront costs. Moreover, having a deep understanding of derivatives was not a guarantee of success. Some of the executives responsible for the largest losses in our sample have mathematical or advanced finance backgrounds. (4) Most financial managers flagrantly underestimated the likelihood of extreme market events. In general, these losses happened after a period of persistent market trends. Financial managers therefore believed that recent market trends would continue for the foreseeable future and overlooked the risk of extreme and unexpected market moves.
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